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Abstract
Since the publication of J. M. Coetzee’s first post-apartheid novel, Disgrace, a number of
scholars have noted the ways that this text encourages its readers to re-think their understanding
of law. Many other scholars have also noted the ways that Disgrace explores the ideas of French
philosopher Gilles Deleuze. However, up until this point, there has been no analysis written that
considers the legal explorations of Disgrace alongside the legal philosophies of Deleuze, and in
this thesis, precisely such an analysis will be offered.
By considering these two bodies of work in light of one another, it will be shown that
Disgrace encourages its readers to re-think their understanding of law through the use of violent
and visceral encounters. By analyzing these disruptions, the thesis will argue that both Disgrace
and Deleuze’s philosophical works encourage readers to think of law differently in three
fundamental ways. First, they both move their readers away from an understanding of law as sets
of rules and procedures, and they both move readers toward an understanding of law as on
ongoing process of jurisprudence. Second, they both reject an image of law that is rooted in
transcendental ideals and values, and they both emphasize instead an image of law that is
grounded in imminent realities. And finally, they both encourage their readers to rethink their
understanding of the subject, displacing the idea of the autonomous, rational, individualistic
subject with the idea of an embodied, fluid, and interconnected subject.
Through these explorations, the law will be interrogated and re-conceptualized as a
regulating force, one that influences the interactions taking place between different assemblages
within a given society and, and it will also be reconsidered in its role as a unique manifestation
of power, one that simultaneously emerges from social discourse and that functions as a
particularly potent form of discourse itself.

4

Table of Contents
Dedication ………………………………………………………………………………………...3
Abstract……………………………………………………………………………………............4
Table of Contents………………………………………………………………………………….5
Introduction: Disgrace’s Engagement with a New Image of Law………………………………..6
Chapter One: Encounters in Disgrace—Rules & Jurisprudence………………...………………13
Chapter Two: Rights in Disgrace—Transcendence & Immanence……...……...………………46
Chapter Three: Animals in Disgrace—Individuals & Assemblages…..………...……………....70
Conclusion: Disgrace’s Engagement with Death—A New Image of Life…...………………….94
Works Cited.…...……………………………………………………………………………….100

5

Introduction
Disgrace’s Engagement with a New Image of Law
In his 1987 Jerusalem Prize acceptance speech, J. M. Coetzee lamented the way that
“unnatural structures of power… define the South African state” (Coetzee & Attwell, 97). He
suggested that these unnatural structures of power have resulted in a literature that is “in
bondage,” one that is unnaturally “preoccupied with power and the torsions of power, unable to
move from elementary relations of contestation, domination, and subjugation to the vast and
complex human world that lies beyond them” (98). Regardless of whether or not these claims are
true of South African literature in general, they certainly do describe Coetzee’s works, all of
which interrogate the “unnatural structures of power… [that] define the South African state,” and
this is especially true of Disgrace, the first novel Coetzee published after the end of apartheid.1
In Disgrace, Coetzee tells the story of David Lurie, a professor of literature who
specializes in Romantic poetry and who is writing an opera about the infamous seducer-ofwomen, Lord Byron. At the very beginning of the story, the reader is told that, to his own mind,
David has “solved the problem of sex rather well,” but as the story unfolds, it becomes
increasingly obvious that this is not the case at all. David has not “solved” the problem of sex,
and this fact is made brutally apparent as David repeatedly engages in acts that violate the
boundaries of his sexual partners. Furthermore, because one of those partners is a student of

1

When the term power is used in this essay, it will always be used in the Foucauldian
sense; one succinct summary of Foucault’s thoughts on power that describes quite accurately the
way that the term will be used throughout this thesis is provided by Nickolas John James’s “Law
and Power: Ten Lessons from Foucault,” in which James writes that Foucault’s works contain
the following insights: “(1) power is not a bad thing; (2) power cannot be abolished; (3) power is
not monopolised by the powerful; (4) power is everywhere; (5) power always provokes
resistance; (6) power shapes knowledge; (7) power determines truth; (8) law is a strategy of
power; (9) law is only one of the many strategies of power; and (10) power and discourse are
non-subjective” (31); see also: Scott, “Foucault’s Analysis of Power’s Methodologies,” 127.
6

David’s—specifically, a twenty-year-old named Melanie Isaacs—David becomes engaged in a
public scandal, one which results in a quasi-legal trial and leads, ultimately, to the loss of his job.
Since he then has no reason to remain in Cape Town, David decides to go and stay with his
daughter Lucy, on her farm in the Eastern Cape.
As soon as David arrives on the farm, it becomes apparent to the reader that David and
Lucy possess very different views of the world. While David thinks in terms of sweeping
histories, transcendental ideas, and individualistic values, Lucy thinks in terms of concrete
realities, immanent relationships, and communal values. And as the remaining events of the story
unfold—including Lucy’s rape/David’s assault by three black men, David’s decision to serve as
cremator for dogs that must be euthanized, and David’s various engagements with black South
Africans who live alongside Lucy on the cape—the differences between these two characters
only continue to become more and more pronounced. On nearly every issue—animal rights,
social justice, the role of the law, the purpose of friendship, the concept of history, the effects of
rape—David and Lucy disagree, and their disagreement invites the reader to think through the
many different issues that they debate with one another (usually in ways that seem very formal
and theoretical). This philosophical pondering, though, should not be understood as idle
contemplation; rather, it is charged with intense emotion for the reader due to the fact that the
issues at stake are so visceral and concrete. Thus, it is appropriate to suggest that Disgrace does
not merely invite to think through these issues, but that it actually forces them to do so by
infusing the debates with images of bodily harm and death.
The fact that Disgrace forces thought in this way—by presenting encounters that are
meant to shock the reader and by staging philosophical debates amongst its characters about
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those encounters—is important to recognize.2 For this tendency to force thought is a unique
characteristic of Coetzee’s writings, and it is a characteristic that causes Coetzee’s writings to
bear a close relationship to the writings of French philosopher Gilles Deleuze. In Deleuze’s
writings, the concept of forcing thought takes on great significance. The reason for this has to do
with Deleuze’s insistence that much of what we think of as the act of thinking is actually the act
of recognition; in other words, we believe that we are engaging with real problems when we are,
in fact, simply subsuming our experiences into our existing categories of recognition. Worse yet,
because we carry with us an idea of what it means to think—a notion which Deleuze refers to as
a “dogmatic image of thought”—we are blind to the ways that thinking has been prevented from
actually occurring. Thus, the only way for real thought to actually take place is when a violent
encounter disrupts the image of thought that we carry with us (Williams 2411). This happens
whenever something is experienced that cannot be made to fit the “image of thought” that the
subject possesses and that, therefore, forces thought to take place in order for an immanent
problem to be addressed (Lefebvre, IL 74).
The fascinating aspect of Coetzee’s writings—in terms of their relation to Deleuze’s
philosophy—is that they are able to stage these sorts of encounters over and over again without
ever allowing the reader to ever feel as if they have “solved” the problems that are raised within
the text. Thus, by reading one of Coetzee’s novels, a reader is forced to think in Deleuzian ways
even if they have never encountered Deleuze’s ideas prior to engaging with the text.
Furthermore, because Coetzee is interested in exploring many of the same metaphysical and
ethical questions that Deleuze explored in his writings, a reader who engages with Coetzee’s
texts is not only exposed to Deleuze’s methods but also to many of Deleuze’s theories about life
When I use the term “encounter,” I am using it in the Deleuzian sense, as described by
Lefebvre in The Image of Law, 59.
2
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and the nature of reality. As Deleuzian scholar and translator Paul Patton contends:
Coetzee deserves to be added to the Deleuzian literary canon [simply] for the way in
which Disgrace presents a conception of pure life as immanent in the everyday
existence of humans and animals alike, for the manner in which the central
protagonist embarks on a line of flight or deterritorialization which transforms his
sense of who he is and his understanding of life, and finally for the process through
which this transformation takes place by means of becoming-animal. (Patton,
“Becoming Animal and Pure Life” 103)
Given the fact that Disgrace explores many of the same ideas that Deleuze explored in his
works—and given the fact that Disgrace also explores the foundations and limitations of
Western legal discourse—it is surprising that more scholarly attention has not been devoted to an
analysis of the novel in terms of Deleuze’s philosophy of law. After all, both Deleuze and
Coetzee seem interested in interrogating the relationship between law and power in their
writings, and a great deal of scholarship has been developed in an effort to reveal the ways that
each of these thinkers, separately, has conducted precisely these sorts of interrogations of the
law.3 Therefore, it seems that it would be fruitful to conduct an analysis of the aspects of
Disgrace that are brought to light when viewed through the lens of Deleuze’s philosophy of law,
and in this thesis, precisely such an analysis will take place. In order to conduct this analysis,
though, it is necessary first, to offer a brief overview of Deleuze’s methods and ideas.
As has already been noted, Deleuze devotes significant attention in Difference and
Two of the studies that concern Disgrace’s relationship to law and that have been
especially important for this thesis include Elizabeth Anker’s “Human Rights, Social Justice, and
J. M. Coetzee’s Disgrace,” and Michelle Kelly’s “Playing it by the Book.” Some of the studies
that concern Deleuze’s relationship to law and that have been especially important for this thesis
include many of the books and essays written by Alexandre Lefebvre, De Sutter & MCGee’s
Deleuze and Law, and Rosi Braidotti’s Deleuze and Law: Forensic Futures.
3
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Repetition to his notion of an “image of thought.” These images, he writes, “take the common
form of an ‘Everybody knows…’” (DR, 130, qtd. in Lefebvre “Habermas” 404). They are the
images that we hold of what it means to think. They “operate on the level of the social and the
unconscious, and function ‘all the more effectively in silence’” (DR 167, qtd. in Lefebvre
“Habermas” 404). For Deleuze, these images of thought prevent real thinking from occurring.
They seek only to recognize phenomena and to subsume it under pre-existing logic, and they are
incapable of allowing new concepts to take form (Williams, loc. 2332). Thus, for Deleuze, the
“dogmatic image of thought” must be violently interrupted in order for thinking to occur, and
this has huge ramifications for Deleuze’s philosophy of law.4
In a Deleuzian philosophy of law, it is assumed that a legal image of thought—an idea of
what law is and how it ought to operate—functions in the background of our minds whenever we
think about law or legal issues. This image can be detected in most Western discourses about
law, and it has a number of distinct characteristics: (1) it invokes false repetition, which for
Deleuze, means that it converts singularities into particulars in order to subsume them under
universalizing rules (Lefebvre “New Image” 106); (2) it functions vis-a-vis an Aristotelian logic
of distributive difference, one which limits true thought by subsuming all cases under
recognizable categories (Lefebvre, “New Image” 108); (3) it relies upon a belief in the validity of
discursively agreed-upon communal norms (Lefebvre, “Habermas” 397); and (4) it encourages
thinking through transcendental values rather than immanent situations.
In this thesis it will be shown that Disgrace engages with these aspects of the
Throughout this thesis, when I refer to Deleuze’s philosophy of law, I am referring to
the works of a number of scholars, including Rosi Braidotti, Paul Patton, Penelope Pether, Marc
Schuilenburg, Lissa Lincoln, David Saunders, and—especially—Alexandre Lefebvre. Because
Deleuze never wrote a text that was specifically devoted to the development of his philosophy of
law, it is the writings of these scholars and others that have given shape to the Deleuzian legal
philosophy that will be used throughout this thesis.
4
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contemporary image of law in ways that encourage the reader to question their legitimacy.
Moreover, it will be shown that the novel accomplishes this rethinking by staging encounters that
violently disrupt the image of law that the reader is likely to hold and by offering reflections on
law that can replace the dogmatic images that have been violently disrupted. From the outset,
though, it must be emphasized that the argument being presented is not that any certain laws
should be replaced by any other certain laws (as might be expected when thinking about the
“new” image of law that is being invoked by Deleuze’s writings). Rather, the claim being made
is more radical; the claim is that the very image of law—the unconscious idea a reader possesses
of what law is and how it functions—is being replaced in Disgrace by a different image of law,
one that is profoundly Deleuzian and one that rejects many of the ideas that underlie
contemporary legal discourse. This new image of law has many characteristics— it rejects a
notion of law as codified rules in favor of a notion of law as creative jurisprudence; it deemphasizes transcendence in order to emphasize immanence; and it ceases to imagine the subject
of law as an individual by imagining instead a complex assemblage as its subject—but the most
important aspect of this image is that is seeks not to describe how law ought to function, but how
law does function. In doing so, it seeks to move legal discourse away from idealistic notions and
toward accurate depictions of the relationship between law and power.
Because this thesis takes for granted many of the insights of the posthuman turn—
including the assumption that the legal subject envisioned by the dogmatic image of law (the
individual, autonomous, rational agent) is being replaced in contemporary thought by a rapidly
evolving, posthumanist notion of the subject—little attention will be devoted in the following
pages to descriptions of posthuman theory in general.5 Rather, this thesis will assume a
5

For more information on the posthumanist ideas that serve as a backdrop for this thesis,
consult the works of Rosi Braidotti, particularly The Posthuman, Posthuman Knowledges, and
11

preliminary knowledge of the ramifications of the posthuman turn, and it will devote full
attention to an analysis of the effects of this turn on the image of law, particularly as it is
presented in Disgrace. In doing so, it will suggest that the humanist image of law is no longer
adequate to address our understanding of the world and that certain works of literature—such as
Disgrace—are helping bring into existence a new image of law, one that more fully incorporates
our current understanding of ourselves and our present place in history.

Posthuman Ecologies.
12

Chapter One
Encounters in Disgrace: Rules & Jurisprudence
When reading Disgrace, it quickly becomes apparent that the novel is conducting some
sort of exploration of the philosophical underpinnings of law. Legal language and legal debates
abound within the text, and a number of scholars have written about this aspect of the novel.6
Elizabeth Anker, for instance, writes that “questions of criminality and legal reparation dominate
both the trajectory of the plot and the philosophical quandaries at issue in J. M. Coetzee’s
Disgrace” (Anker 233). Similarly, Michelle Kelly insists that Disgrace “emerges from a context
in which the political is saturated by the legal or juridical,” and she argues that this fact “has
surfaced in recent critical accounts” of the novel (Kelly 161). And even a cursory consideration
of some of the major moments in the text—such as a consideration of the committee-hearing
scene or a consideration of the conversations that take place between David and Lucy—call to
mind an abundance of legal issues that the text is exploring. Thus, there is little question that one
of the major concerns of Disgrace is an exploration of philosophies of law. There are, however, a
number of questions that remain about those explorations. Why, for instance, does Disgrace use
the language of legal discourse to depict matters that seem to lie beyond the scope of the
law? Why does it frequently tie the legal questions it raises to other discourses, such as those of
history or literature? And what effect does the novel's treatment of legal philosophy have upon
the reader?
In answering these questions, it is extremely helpful to consider Disgrace alongside the
philosophy of Gilles Deleuze. One reason that such a reading is especially fruitful is because

This is also true of many of Coetzee’s other works, such as his recently finished Jesus
trilogy, in which questions about the philosophical underpinnings of law are perhaps even more
pronounced than they are in Disgrace.
6
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Disgrace encourages readers to think in exactly the ways that are called for in Deleuze’s
writings, and when the former is read in the light of the latter, a number of its seemingly
ambiguous elements are given new meaning and coherence. At the same time, when Disgrace is
used as a lens through which to understand Deleuze’s philosophy, a number of the abstract ideas
that Deleuze writes about take on a tangible form. Thus, a reading of Disgrace alongside the
writings of Deleuze helps shed light on both bodies of work.
In this chapter, such a reading will be conducted, and specific attention will be drawn to
the elements of Disgrace that encourage readers to think of law in new ways. Specifically, it will
be shown that there are many aspects of the text that prompt readers to distance themselves from
the idea that law exists as a set of codified rules and to think, instead, of law as a process of
jurisprudence. Prior to considering some of those aspects, though, it is helpful to first understand
Deleuze’s thoughts on both laws and jurisprudence, which are best expressed in some of the
interviews he conducted over the years. In a conversation with Antonio Negri, for instance, he
states, “what interests me isn’t the law [la loi] or laws [les lois] (the former being an empty
notion, the latter uncritical notions), nor even law or rights, but jurisprudence. It’s jurisprudence,
ultimately, that creates law, and we mustn’t go on leaving this to judges” (Lefebvre, “A New
Image of Law” 103). This statement makes a distinction between three different concepts of law,
and it is important to consider them each in turn.
The three distinctions that can be drawn from Deleuze’s exchange with Negri are the
following: a) the idea of law as a transcendental concept, b) the idea of law as a codified set of
rules, and c) the idea of law as a creative act of jurisprudence. For Deleuze, the first of these
notions is “empty” because it neglects concrete situations in favor of transcendental ideas about
how law ought to work in an ideal society. This point will be explored in greater depth in the
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next chapter, but for now, it is sufficient to say that, because of Deleuze’s commitment to radical
immanence in all of his works, it is obvious that he would find this notion of law to be deeply
problematic. The second notion of law—that of law as a list of codified rules—is also very
troubling for Deleuze, primarily because his philosophy emphasizes the need to unblock the
flows and movements that can become blocked by a variety of forces. In the case of legal
thought, this occurs when the dogmatic image of law prevents real thought from taking place by
attempting to subsume all cases under a set of applicable rules (Lefebvre, The Image of Law, 3).
As Alexandre Lefebvre explains, this image of law is problematic for Deleuze because it
prevents the law from maximizing its potential to do what it is capable of doing. Specifically, it
prevents the law from ‘becoming’ through its engagement with legal problems.
In Deleuze’s philosophy, the concepts doing and becoming take on great significance.
They do so because, for Deleuze, one of the main limitations of Western thought has been its
tendency to categorize and to identify the essence of a particular thing or idea. This need to
identify leads subjects to think of difference as “difference between” rather than as “difference in
itself” (Deleuze, Difference & Repetition, 28). This matters because thinking of difference as
“difference between” leads to a diminished appreciation for the processes of differential
repetition that are taking place everywhere, at all times, allowing for new becomings. Because
these processes of repetition always include some degree of change, everything that exists—
including the law—is always in a continual state of instability, allowing for new connections to
be continually made. Thus, Deleuze doesn’t write about things as stable or even definable. For
Deleuze, there is no point at which anything—a self, a society, an organ, or a concept such as
law—is able to be fully defined and separated from the intensive fields in which it exists. In fact,
these things—these images—ought not to be thought of as things at all; rather, they ought to be
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thought of in terms of their intensities, in terms of their origins, and in terms of their processes of
becoming. The reason they ought to be thought of in such ways is because this way of thinking
not only allows for a greater understanding of the particular image being considered but it also
allows for greater insight into the potentials for new becomings that exist within a given image,
and this has significant ramifications for a Deleuzian image of law.
For Deleuze, law is an intensive field. In his philosophy, there is no point at which
something ceases to be legal. Rather, points exist where the intensity of the legal becomes more
or less pronounced. As De Sutter and McGee write: “Legal institutions are rhizomes, and legal
reasoning is rhizomatic extension, pulsation, fulguration [and] it is a damaging error to act, in
legal theory, as though law was a stable entity, a creature of pre-givenness, necessity,
apodicticity” (12). Deleuze often uses the concept of a rhizome to explain his thinking about the
overlapping connections that bring into existence a certain thing, concept, or idea. Just as there is
no point at which the bulb of a certain rhizome—such as the fruiting body (the mushroom) of a
mycelium web—can be discernibly separated from the rhizomatic web in which it exists—the
small tendrils, spores, other offshoots, and even the soil or air of the mushroom rhizome—so,
too, is it impossible to separate an entity, such as law, from the connections that converge in
order to temporarily stabilize its current manifestation.7 However, because the dogmatic image of
law presents law as a pre-given reality, thinking is often blocked from seeing both the origins of
law’s current manifestation and the potentials for its becoming. Thus, a Deleuzian image of law
places great emphasis on removing these blockages and on identifying both the intensities and

As Deleuze and Guattari write in A Thousand Plateaus: “Let us summarize the principal
characteristics of a rhizome: unlike trees or their roots, the rhizome connects any point to any
other point, and its traits are not necessarily linked to traits of the same nature; it brings into play
very different regimes of signs, and even nonsign states. The rhizome is reducible neither to the
One nor the multiple.” (Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 21)
7
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the connections that define the current function of the law. Where does the intensity of the
concept “legal” end? Where is it most manifest? And what must be true of the world if the
current manifestation has been able to come into existence (Colebrook 13)?8 Ultimately,
Deleuze’s philosophy advances an image of law that concerns itself not so much with what law
is but, rather, with what law does, where law’s influence is intensified, and where the limits lie in
law’s potential process of becoming.
Of course, there is much more that could be written about each of these aspects of a
Deleuzian image of law—and indeed, the remainder of this thesis will focus on exploring these
ideas by revealing the ways that Disgrace engages with each of them—but the important thing,
for now, is to notice that nothing in Deleuze’s image of law focuses on the aspects of law that are
most present in the dogmatic image. There is nothing to be said, for instance, about social
contracts or establishing the difference between legitimate and illegitimate laws (Moore 133);
there is no mention of judges who decree which sets of rules can be best applied to a case at hand
(Lefebvre, The Image of Law 6); there is no focus placed on the idea that laws result from
legislative processes which are, themselves, influenced by democratic discourse (Lefebvre, The
Image of Law, 38); and there is no assumption that “coherent set[s] of principles” or values are
represented within legitimate laws (Lefebvre 31).
The reason for this absence isn’t because Deleuze denies that judges and legislative
processes are part of law; it is simply because his notion of law advocates for a much broader
understanding of its scope, and he rejects lines of thought that would diminish this understanding

“This world as it is known and lived emerged from a range of potentialities that have a
real range and conditions. The real, though, is not the actual. What Deleuze is doing with theory
is demanding that we do not accept any structure without interrogating its real emergence. There
can only be concepts, laws and societies because of a virtual potentiality that allows for the
creation of actual instances.” (Colebrook 13)
8
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(De Sutter 4). For Deleuze, the work performed by judges, lawyers, and legislators is far less
important—in terms of an analysis of the law’s function—than are the micropolitical interactions
that take place within and amongst different subjects in a given society (Patton, “Immanence,
Transcendence” 29; Lefebvre, “Human Rights…” 53). Given this fact, it becomes much easier to
see why so many of the situations that are presented in Disgrace are presented with language that
suggests they are legal problems even though the dogmatic image of law would not regard them
as such; for when these situations are considered in the light of Deleuze’s philosophy, it is clear
that they are, in fact, problems for the law.
By presenting situations in which harm has occurred but in which it is unclear how that
harm ought to be rectified, Disgrace forces readers to think through legal problems in exactly the
way Deleuze envisions when he speaks of an encounter that “forces” thought to think (Lefebvre,
Image of Law, 72). For Deleuze, thought is normally prevented from taking place because
recognition dominates so many of our interactions. Only when we experience “an unanticipated
and violent encounter” can thought be stimulated “past the purview of recognition” (Lefebvre,
The Image of Law 72). This violence, though, should not be thought of as a physical violence.
Rather, it is an epistemological violence, one that occurs “whenever clichés, habits, categories,
and propositional certitudes are no longer sufficient to account for, think, and react within a
situation” (Lefebvre, The Image of Law 73).
Disgrace, of course, is filled with exactly these sorts of situations—ones in which none of
the reader’s concepts of law or justice seem adequate to address the situation at hand—and these
situations force the reader to think in jurisprudential terms by causing them to search for ethical
solutions where none seem to exist. For instance, when Disgrace presents David’s sexual
interactions with Melanie, it does so with language that makes it very difficult for the reader to
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decide how they ought to feel about those interactions. At every point where the text indicates
that Melanie has, indeed, been coerced into having sex with David against her will, it also
presents language that casts doubt upon that conclusion.
For example, between pages 14 and 21 of the text, Melanie explicitly rejects David’s
advances at least five times (often by even saying the word “no” in response to his advances).
Now, in most stories, this fact would allow the reader to conclude that David’s actions
undoubtedly constitute sexual harassment, if not outright rape; in this story, however, each of
those statements of “no” is undermined by textual evidence that suggests Melanie might not
actually be saying no: the first instance, for example, is followed by a hug; the second, third, and
fourth instances are framed by two lines in which Melanie thanks David for giving her a ride
home; and the fifth instance is closely followed by the statement that “she does not resist” (14,
17, and 21, respectively).
The effect of these juxtapositions—especially during a first encounter with the text—is to
make the reader feel confused about how to interpret its events. For while they are likely to
experience uncomfortable emotions when reading about the events described in this section of
the novel, they are also led to doubt their initial assumptions as they engage with various phrases
that lead them to believe that Melanie does desire the events that are taking place. For example,
when David first rests his hand against Melanie’s cheek, the text says that “she does not
withdraw” (14). Similarly, when David shows up at Melanie’s home unannounced and begins
making his sexual intentions known, Melanie says, “No, not now,” implying that she might be
interested in David’s advances at a different time (22, emphasis added). Finally, the text tells the
reader that, during one of Melanie’s encounters with David, “she lets him lay her out on the bed
and undress her: she even helps him, raising her arms and then her hips” and that “she hooks a
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leg behind his buttocks to draw him in closer” (27, emphasis added). Through phrases such as
these, Disgrace creates uncertainty in the reader, and it is this sense of uncertainty that causes
them—forces them—to think through a situation in which their image of justice—their inherent
notions of right and wrong—do not easily apply. This is a case in which recognition fails, and it
fails precisely because the novel is designed to force the reader to experience an encounter.
These sexual encounters with Melanie, however, are not the only ways in which Disgrace
creates such encounters. In fact, I would argue that Disgrace’s plot consists primarily of a series
of encounters, ones which force readers to think (in a Deleuzian sense of the term) and which
build upon and complicate one another in the same way that legal cases build upon and
complicate one another. Through these encounters, Disgrace immerses the reader in a complex
web of situations and it leaves it to the reader to think through the problems and questions that
are raised by these encounters, thus forcing the reader to engage in Deleuzian acts of
jurisprudence.
For example, once the reader has experienced the section of the novel in which Lucy is
raped, they view the interactions that took place between David and Melanie in a very different
light. After having witnessed Lucy’s pain—and after having been forced to contemplate the
different ways in which people of different subject positions (different genders; different ages;
different racial identities) experience and interpret events—the reader gains greater insight into
the harm that was caused to Melanie by David’s actions. The text insures that readers are forced
to rethink their initial reaction to the first chapters of the novel by including a number of
passages that link David’s actions to those of Lucy’s rapists.
After the rape, for instance, as David and Lucy are discussing the events that took place,
David says, “I am sure they tell themselves many things,” indicating that he realizes the rapists
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are capable of justifying their actions to themselves in a way that blinds them to the harm they
have caused (155). Ironically, he does not recognize this same tendency within himself, but Lucy
does, and through her insight, the reader is also made aware of the similarities between David’s
tendencies and the tendencies he believes the rapists possess.
Additionally, because Lucy’s response to David includes the phrase “you are a man, you
ought to know,” a connection is created between David and the rapists, suggesting that David
ought to understand the things that were taking place in the rapists’ mind as they raped Lucy, and
the reader is thus prompted to consider the similarities or differences between the two situations.
This reconsideration is further encouraged due to the fact that Lucy’s response includes a
description of rape that closely mirrors the text’s description of David’s interactions with
Melanie. Lucy says, “When you have sex with someone strange—when you trap her, hold her
down, get her under you, put all your weight on her—isn’t it a bit like killing?”, and this
phrasing calls to the reader’s mind two of the most vivid images of David’s sexual encounters
with Melanie: the first, when the reader is told that she is ”lying beneath him, her eyes closed,
her hands slack above her head” (17); and the second, when the text reads that “she had decided
to go slack, die within herself for the duration, like a rabbit when the jaws of the fox close on its
neck” (22) By carefully allowing Lucy’s description of the rape to parallel the text’s earlier
description of the events that were described as “not rape, not quite”—and by specifically using
language that describes being pinned down and dying to describe both situations—the reader is
positioned to draw connections between the two events in their mind and to re-think their
response to the first encounter that the text staged between Melanie and David.
The question must be asked, though: how can the claim be made that a re-thinking of the
earlier events must take place after the reader is exposed to Lucy’s rape and her description of it?

21

Certainly, it is clear that the two sections are designed to parallel one another, but isn’t it
possible—perhaps even likely—that many readers would recognize the harm being done to both
women as they were reading about these two descriptions of predatory sexual behavior? Isn’t it
possible that the reader has always considered David’s actions toward Melanie to be in the
wrong? Such questions are worth asking, but as will be shown, the text has been constructed in
such a way that the reader is extremely unlikely to recognize the harm being done to Melanie
when they are reading the first few chapters of the novel, despite the fact that there is actually
plenty of evidence that ought to have caused them to do so.
One of the primary ways that Disgrace blinds the reader to the harm that they should
have been able to recognize is through its use of the close third-person point of view. Because the
point of view in the story is not that of an omniscient narrator, but rather, that of a narrator who is
only able to portray events through the lens of David’s thoughts, the reader is placed in a position
of sympathy with David. Because the reader sees the events taking place through the lens of
David’s thoughts, they are initially hesitant to regard David’s actions as rape, and they are
initially primed to see—as David does—the many reasons why his relationship with Melanie is
morally acceptable. This closeness to David’s thought also encourages the reader to dismiss the
many phrases which suggest that David is being predatory in his actions. Quite a few of these
phrases exist in the early chapters of the novel, and the fact that the reader is able to read them
without concluding simply that David is a predatory figure offers a testament to the novel’s
ability—and determination—to keep the reader in a state of uncertainty regarding their
interpretation of the text’s events.
Consider, for instance, the fact that the novel describes David as reaching out, unbidden,
to touch Melanie’s cheek (14). Or the fact that he violates her privacy by letting himself into the
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department office in order to copy down all of her personal information (16). Or the fact that the
novel says he “tries to put her at ease” (suggesting that he can tell she is not at ease and yet
doesn’t alter his interactions with her) (16). Or the fact that he shows up at her house, having
given her “no warning,” making her “too surprised to resist” his intrusion (21). In a simpler
novel, these passages would simply be allowed to stand out, and they would be used to create an
image of a character who ought to be feared or judged harshly. They would not be complicated
by other lines that cause the reader to question David’s culpability—or Melanie’s complicity—in
these events. They would also, certainly, not be placed alongside a passage in which Melanie
seems to willingly engage in sex with David. But because such lines and passages are included,
the reader is thrust into a position in which they are uncertain of whether or not David is guilty,
and this position is further complicated by the fact that the reader is continually exposed to
David’s internal thoughts as they read the text. Because they are presented with a point of view
that expresses David’s feelings about events as they are unfolding, the reader is primed to
sympathize with David; at the same time though, because the novel also constantly presents
evidence that undermines David’s feelings about the events taking place, the reader is forced to
doubt their interpretation of the events, leading them to feel extremely uncertain about any
interpretation they are making of the text.
This uncertainty is by no means an accident. In fact, it is one of the central effects of
Disgrace, one that reinforces the novel’s engagement with a Deleuzian image of law, and it
functions on several levels. As has already been shown, the uncertainty that the reader feels
about their interpretation of David’s interactions with Melanie causes them to wrestle with their
notions of right-and-wrong; they have a sense that something wrong is happening, but they are
prevented—through the text’s back-and-forth weaving of contradictory evidence—from
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assigning clear blame or responsibility. They are prevented from simply recognizing a situation
and assigning to that situation a pre-given label, such as rape or harassment, and they are thus
forced to think in jurisprudential terms about a situation that Deleuze would describe as a
“problem for law.” This jurisprudential thinking is continued, though—and slightly altered—
with each new passage of the text. Once the reader has read the scene that describes Lucy’s rape,
they are forced to reconsider their initial reaction to the scenes describing the interactions that
took place between Melanie and David, and because they have been vividly exposed to the harm
that was done to Lucy, they are now more likely to think about those scenes in terms of the harm
that was also done to Melanie. Their interpretation of the interactions are now likely to place less
emphasis on assigning a term to the crime and more emphasis on tracing the specifics of the
harm that was done. In this way, the uncertainty that is intentionally woven into the text opens up
space for the reader to think in the same ways that are envisioned in a Deleuzian image of law; it
opens up space for them to think through legal problems jurisprudentially, without simply
resorting to acts of recognition and subsumption.
In addition to the ways that it forces readers to think by preventing them from resorting
to recognition and by causing them to consider a legal problem in the light of a different-yetrelated legal problem, the novel uses uncertainty by drawing attention to its own unstable
systems of signification. In other words, the text is extremely self-aware of the ways that it
deconstructs itself, and it accomplishes this level of self-awareness through its use of an
extremely fluid point-of-view, one that flows back and forth between a subjective and an
objective perspective constantly and which also, at times, veers off into territory that could not be
described as either subjective or objective. In order to understand why this is relevant to the
novel’s engagement with images of law, it is important to recognize that the narration presented
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in Disgrace is not simply a close third-person voice; rather, it is a close third-person voice that is
disrupted constantly by interjections of free indirect discourse that reflect David’s thinking at
that moment in the text. These snippets of free indirect discourse offer the reader insight into
David’s mind, but they do not do so with David’s own words. Rather, they cause the character to
seem to speak “as if he were listening to his own words reported by someone else” (Cinema 2,
242).
This effect—which is present all throughout Disgrace—has been written about
extensively by Deleuze in his two volumes of cinematic literary criticism, Cinema 1 and Cinema
2. In these works, Deleuze describes the free indirect perspective as the “fourth person singular,”
and he argues that it opens up space for a viewpoint that is neither subjective nor objective;
rather, it presents a voice that is extra self-aware and that draws the reader’s attention to the
forces that have shaped a character’s subjectivity, even while they are watching that subjectivity
act itself out before them (Schwartz 125). When describing how this effect is applied in cinema,
Deleuze writes, “the distinction between what the character saw subjectively and what the
camera saw objectively vanished, not in favor of one or the other, but because the camera
assumed a subjective presence, acquired an internal vision, which entered into a relation of
simulation (‘mimesis’) with the character’s way of seeing” (Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2 483). The
irony, though, is that this effect of seeing the world as the character sees it draws the reader’s
attention more closely to the subjective nature of the character’s viewpoint, thus allowing for
greater critical exploration of the forces that have shaped the character’s thought.
Deleuze’s description of the free, indirect viewpoint in cinema is extremely helpful in
understanding the different degrees of objective and subjective perspectives that fluctuate
throughout Disgrace. For although the entire novel is narrated through a close, third-person point
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of view that only allows the reader to perceive events through the lens of David’s thought, the
degree to which the reader is made aware of that lens shifts, sometimes reflecting a viewpoint
that could be considered more objective and, at other times, presenting events or ideas in a much
more subjective way. This difference is most obvious when passages of direct dialogue—which
seem to the reader to be entirely objective—are placed alongside descriptions of events that are
recognizably being filtered through the lens of David’s worldview. For example, when news first
breaks of David’s interactions with Melanie, he goes to visit his ex-wife Rosalind for dinner, and
because their conversation is mostly presented as direct dialogue, the reader perceives the scene
through a more distant and objective perspective than they would if the conversation were simply
being delivered through David’s internal monologue. However, after Rosalind finishes briefly
chastising David about his indiscretion, the passage shifts into David’s mind by relaying events
directly through the lens of his thought:
The old tone has entered, the tone of the last years of their married life: passionate
recrimination. Even Rosalind must be aware of that. Yet perhaps she has a point. Perhaps
it is the right of the young to be protected from the sight of their elders in the throes of
passion. That is what whores are for, after all: to put up with the ecstasies of the unlovely.
(Disgrace 42)
This close, subjective perspective carries the story forward while also offering the reader insight
into David’s feelings about the events that are unfolding around him. In this case, the subjective
perspective allows the reader to become aware of David’s indifference to Rosalind’s claims
while also indicating that, although David may consider her point to be valid, he does not feel the
weight of her chastisement in any meaningful way. Furthermore, David’s concluding thought—a
jaded reflection on the purpose of sex workers in society—indicates to the reader that David is
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primarily thinking about his situation in disengaged and abstract ways.
In the scene just considered, the distinction between the subjective and the objective
perspective is rather clear and straightforward, and if this were true throughout Disgrace, then
Deleuze’s concept of the free indirect perspective would not be particularly relevant to a
consideration of the novel. However, in Disgrace, the perspective being offered is rarely so clear.
At times, the use of direct dialogue or thought tags—“he would like to have said” or “he
thinks”—makes the scene seem quite objective, and at other times, the novel pointedly indicates
to the reader they are within David’s mind, thus marking the scene as highly subjective. But at
many points in the novel, the events described are presented in a way that makes the reader
aware of multiple perspectives at the same time. As Deleuze puts it, “a character acts on the
screen, and is assumed to see the world in a certain way. But simultaneously, the camera sees
him, and sees his world, from another point of view that thinks, reflects and transforms the
viewpoint of the character” (Deleuze, Cinema 1 74). In Disgrace, this effect is created in a
number of ways, but the overall result is twofold: first, the reader remains constantly aware of
the lens through which David sees the world; and second, the reader is forced to remain
constantly uncertain about how to interpret the information they are receiving through the lens of
David’s thoughts.
One of the primary ways that Disgrace causes the reader to be aware of the lens through
which they are receiving the story is to include within its narration questions that are loaded with
multiple meanings. For instance, when David is first taking Melanie out to dinner, the text
interrupts their conversation with the line: “Too far. What is far, what is too far, in a matter like
this? Is her too far the same as his too far?” (17). This question seems to be simultaneously
directed at three people: David, the reader, and Melanie. The line, of course, allows the reader to
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glimpse into David’s mind, but at the same time—due to its presentation without any dialogue
tags such as “he thought”—it seems to come directly at the reader, as an interjection in the
narrative, thus prompting them to briefly ask themselves the question: what is too far?
Furthermore, because this line includes a reference to Melanie’s mind—“Is her too far the same
as his too far?”—the reader’s focus is also directed toward Melanie’s perspective, and they are
reminded to consider her interpretation of the events alongside David’s.
By shifting the closeness of the narration back and forth in this way—sometimes striving
more toward objectivity, sometimes indicating that the perspective is very subjective, and
sometimes creating a subjective perspective that draws extra attention to its subjective nature—
Disgrace creates a dynamic in which the reader is reminded constantly to consider the lens
through which they are receiving the story, and at many times, this leads the reader to struggle to
determine how to make meaning from a certain passage. For example, consider again this
description of one of David’s sexual encounters with Melanie:
Not rape, not quite that, but undesired nevertheless, undesired to the core. As though she
had decided to go slack, die within herself for the duration, like a rabbit when the jaws of
the fox close on its neck. So that everything done to her might be done, as it were, far
away. (Disgrace 23)
Although this passage—which seems to be simultaneously a statement to the reader and a
glimpse into David’s mind—begins with the insistence that the events transpiring are “not rape,
not quite,” the remainder of the passage offers evidence that Melanie was significantly violated
by David’s actions. The images and phrases presented are ones that carry with them intense
connotations of death and emptiness—“undesired to the core”; “die within herself”; “like a rabbit
when the jaws of the fox close on its neck”—and yet the language being presented is also
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unquestionably David’s. The use of repetitive clauses that build upon themselves along with the
use of metaphors marks a style that the reader has come to accept as David’s own. In Deleuze’s
words, there is a “literalness of the voice,” an effect that is like David “listening to his own
words reported by someone else” (Deleuze, Cinema 2 242). The result is a passage that strikes
the reader in a number of different ways simultaneously. First, they are told that the sexual act is
“not rape.” Yet, at the same time, they are presented with evidence that Melanie is being
significantly harmed. And yet they are also being reminded that this portrayal is merely David’s
interpretation of the events, leading to the question: was the actual encounter more violating than
is being presented? Or less? Is David overthinking Melanie’s resistance? Or is he downplaying
the negative impact for the reader?
The novel’s use of this “fourth-person singular” voice creates uncertainty in the reader
not only regarding David’s interactions with Melanie but also regarding every aspect of the text,
and this becomes especially important to consider when thinking about the ways that Disgrace
addresses issues of race. Often, Disgrace has been criticized for the way in which it portrays
black characters. It was decried as a racist novel by the ANC, and it has received scathing
criticism from South African writers such as Nadine Gordimer and Christopher van Wyk, the
latter of whom condemned the way that, in this novel, “the white characters are fleshed out, the
black evildoers are not” (Smith 31, Mardorossian 72). While these criticisms may certainly be
legitimate, it is also important to remember that all of the characters and events that are portrayed
in Disgrace are being presented through the lens of David’s thoughts. More importantly, though,
it is important to remember that they are being presented through the lens of David’s thoughts in
a way that consistently draws attention to that lens. Thus, while it is true that most readers will
feel very uncomfortable—and even disgusted—when experiencing the novel’s portrayal of black
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characters, it is also true that this discomfort seems to be an intentional affect of the novel, one
that is created through close proximity to David’s racist and sexist way of understanding the
world and one that is revealed through consideration of all the ways in which the novel is selfaware of its distorted narrative lens.
Even during some of the most dramatic and intense scenes in Disgrace, attention is
drawn toward David’s white, eurocentric worldview. Just before he is set on fire, for instance,
the reader is given this insight into his mind:
He speaks Italian, he speaks French, but Italian and French will not save him here in
darkest Africa. He is helpless, an Aunt Sally, a figure from a cartoon, a missionary in
cassock and topi waiting with clasped hands and upcast eyes while the savages jaw
away in their own lingo preparatory to plunging him into their boiling cauldron.
Mission work: what has it left behind, that huge enterprise of upliftment? Nothing
that he can see. (93)
In this short passage, there are a number of phrases that give insight into the way that David sees
others. The words “darkest Africa,” “savages,” and “their own lingo” reflect David’s binary
understanding of his society. He thinks in terms of those who are “civilized” and those who are
not, and this way of seeing the world inevitably causes him to see those who do not align with
eurocentric values to appear like caricatures. So while it is true that the black characters in
Disgrace are not “fleshed out”—and while it is true that they are even presented mostly in
unfavorable lights—the thinness of these characters’ depictions tells the reader much more about
David than it does about any other character.
However, it is important not to miss the fact that Disgrace is full of narrative markers that
remind the reader that they are experiencing the world through the lens of a particular person,
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one who has been deeply shaped by discourses about race, gender, and civilization. This lens is
revealed by a number of textual cues, including language that paints the world in accordance
with poetic or literary ideals, questions that are posed to both David and the reader, and an
obsession with historical ironies. By scattering these reminders of the lens through which the
story is being conveyed—and even including them when describing moments that are horrifying
or terrifying—the text makes it difficult for the reader to ever forget that they are experiencing
the events and the people of the story through David’s eyes, and this allows the story to achieve
certain results that would not be possible otherwise.
One of the affects that is made possible by “fourth-person singular” style that is deployed
throughout Disgrace is that readers who happen to inhabit a similar subject position to David—
which includes all readers who are shaped by Western ideas about law, education, and society,
but especially white, male readers—are often forced to ask themselves where they “ought” to
part ways with David’s thinking. Of course, at times, this feels natural, such as when David is
blatantly ignoring Melanie’s attempts to resist him or when he is commenting on Bev Shaw’s
“dumpy little” body or when he is making fun of traditional Sotho and Xhosa names (22, 77,
194). However, the majority of the narration in Disgrace is presented so fluidly, with a voice that
is so confident and elegant, that it can be extremely difficult for the reader to remain at a critical
distance from David’s rendering of events. Often, it is easy for a reader—especially a white,
male reader who is familiar with David’s manner of speaking—to become lost in the narration
and to forget that they are experiencing these events through an extremely distorted lens, one
that is prone to see almost everything in a racist and sexist way.
When analyzing the text closely, it becomes apparent that nearly every description
presented in the book—from David’s description of other people to his description of Petrus’s
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party to his description of the events that are taking place around him—is being presented in a
light that is either racist or sexist to different degrees, and because these degrees fluctuate, the
reader is often prevented from noticing the racist and sexist rhetoric they are accepting as
objective narration until a certain cue within the text crosses their threshold of tolerance. When
this happens, it is possible for a reader to be alerted to the way that David’s deeply distorted view
of the world has seemed natural to them. Thus, for many readers, Disgrace presents the
possibility of confronting the degree to which their own worldview has been distorted by the
sorts of racist and sexist discourses that make it possible to accept David’s rendition of people
and events as straightforward. And through its use of the “fourth-person singular” viewpoint,
which fluctuates constantly back and forth between a seemingly objective presentation of events
and one that reminds the reader—quite clearly—that no such presentation has ever been taking
place at any point within the text, Disgrace makes such an effect not only possible, but probable.
Ultimately, there is no transcendental voice present in Disgrace that could grant
legitimacy to the conclusions that the reader might make about this passage or about any passage
in the text. At the same time, though, the novel does not seem to be trying to make the reader
completely doubt the reliability of its narrative, as is the case in many other poststructuralist
novels. Rather, Disgrace most consistently uses its narrative style in order to draw attention to its
internal inconsistencies and to force the reader to make decisions about morality, ethics, and law
in spite of those inconsistencies. As the text forces the reader to engage in this process—as it
forces them to make meaning without recourse to a stable narrative—it mirrors a process that is
envisioned by a Deleuzian image of law: a process by which subjects are forced to make
meaning from unstable legal discourses. Disgrace mirrors this process by presenting a text that is
both self-conscious about its own internal inconsistencies and by simultaneously devoting itself
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to an exploration of the philosophical underpinnings of law. Because the reader is always made
aware of fact that they cannot derive any fixed meaning from the text—because each
interpretation is always intentionally undermined by evidence for a different interpretation—they
are forced to think of the text as always open to a certain range of new meanings and
interpretations, just as the law is always unstable and always open to a certain range of new
meanings and interpretations. Moreover, by never allowing its questions about legal philosophy
to recede very far into the background of the text, the text prompts the reader to make their
interpretations while they are also thinking about the way that law functions in society.
One of the sections of the novel in which this connection between legal philosophy and
textual interpretation is especially apparent is the committee-hearing scene. In this scene, David
is called before a committee of his peers in order to give his account of his interactions with
Melanie. However, as soon as the scene begins, it is marked by a number of phrases that indicate
that it is exploring the scope of the law. The first and most obvious of these phrases occurs when
the head of the committee asks David if he has any reservations about the makeup of the
committee. In response, David says that he has no “challenge in a legal sense,” but that he does
have “reservations of a philosophical kind” which he supposes are “out of bounds” (45). This
distinction between the legal and the institutional is then brought up again and again as the scene
progresses, with the head of the committee repeatedly insisting that the investigation they are
conducting has no legal authority. At the same time, though, the reader is made very aware that
real consequences are going to flow from the actions of the committee, and David himself
repeatedly resists the idea that the committee is not a legal institution. Thus, the reader is forced
to ask themselves: what are the limits of the law? When does something become a legal issue and
when is it not a legal issue? If the committee wields power and makes normative decisions about
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how professors are or are not to interact with students, then what difference is there between their
actions and the actions taken by a different legal body?
In a moment, it will be shown that this passage of the text engages with these questions in
complex and nuanced ways, but before analyzing the committee-hearing scene in close detail, it
is helpful to consider some of Deleuze’s concepts about the scope of the law and the nature of
power because they are relevant for an analysis of the scene. In particular, it is helpful to focus
on three of Deleuze’s concepts that help to make discussions of power more tangible: the
assemblage, the molar, and the molecular. For Deleuze, the concept of the assemblage helps to
bypass the categorical thinking that threatens to prevent thought from occurring. Rather than
regarding an image—the self, the society, the law—as a pre-given thing, Deleuze suggests that
these images ought to be regarded as rhizomatic assemblages, points of overlap where certain
connections have created a momentarily stable site of intensity. Thus, a given institution, such as
the university committee or South African society, has been brought into existence by a certain
set of connections, and in order to understand the potentials for such an institution, it is essential
to understand the connections that caused it to emerge. As Claire Colebrook explains:
What Deleuze is doing with theory is demanding that we do not accept any structure
without interrogating its real emergence. There can only be concepts, laws and societies
because of a virtual potentiality that allows for the creation of actual instances…. For
Deleuze, a strong theory of the virtual allows us to take a given positive phenomenon,
such as a law, and look at its actual and historical genesis and then look at its potentiality.
(13)
In addition to understanding an assemblage’s origins and potentials though, Deleuze also
emphasizes the need to trace an assemblage’s segmentation, in order to understand which aspects
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of that assemblage are changing rapidly and which aspects are changing slowly. To help make
this task more tangible, he offers the concepts of the molar and the molecular. The molar he
defines as that which tends toward stasis, while the molecular is that which tends toward change
and movement. However, these concepts should not be regarded as binaries, but rather as
relations to one another. Just as a large amount of molecules (a mole) takes on given properties
that none of the molecules individually possess, so too, does a molar segmentation of an
assemblage take on properties that the molecular segmentations of that assemblage lack.9 At the
same time, though, the molar still derives its form from the molecular and the molar has some
influence over the potential becomings that exist on the molecular level.
One way of understanding this idea is by considering the French Revolution. According
to Deleuze, the important thing to think about in an analysis of the Revolution is the question:
“[W]hich peasants, in which areas of the south of France, stopped greeting the local
landowners?” (Deleuze and Guattari, 216). As Brent Adkins explains: “The molecular flow of
courtesies that accompanied the molar segmentation of land, landowners, and peasants, began at
some point to turn against the molar segmentation and interrupt it. It is on this level that the
revolution began and spread” (loc. 2620). The molar segmentation of the assemblage that was
pre-revolutionary France began to change on the molecular level, and it is impossible to
understand the molar change without considering the molecular change that preceded it. By

Two passages from Deleuze and Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus may help shed light on
these concepts: “There is no question, however, of establishing a dualist opposition between the
two types of multiplicities, molecular machines and molar machines; that would be no better
than the dualism between the One and the multiple. There are only multiplicities of multiplicities
forming a single assemblage, operating in the same assemblage: packs in masses and masses in
packs” (34); “Movement has an essential relation to the imperceptible; it is by nature
imperceptible. Perception can grasp movement only as the displacement of a moving body or the
development of a form. Movements, becomings, in other words, pure relations of speed and
slowness, pure affects, are below and above the threshold of perception” (280–281).
9
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thinking of a given assemblage, such as law, in terms of its molar and molecular segmentations,
it is possible to create a more accurate image of that assemblage and to do more with the image
that is created. In terms of law, this means creating an image that helps to account for its actual
(rather than theoretical) genesis, to understand its actual effects, and to chart the range of its
actual potentials.
The committee-hearing scene in Disgrace encourages readers to think of law in these
terms in three different ways. First, it stages the debate about the scope of the law by causing
David and a few other characters to insist on a limited range of the law’s influence while causing
other characters to insist on a more expansive image of law. Second, it displaces the idea that the
law exists as a pre-given reality by symbolically recreating the complex web of interactions from
which the law emerges. And third, it draws attention to the fact that the law receives its
legitimacy from social discourse, thus undermining the image of the law as a codified set of rules
that need simply be applied to a given situation (Kelly 173). In order to appreciate the effect that
this passage of the novel has upon the reader, though, it is necessary to consider each of these
aspects in turn.
As soon as the reader begins engaging with the committee-hearing scene in Disgrace,
they notice that the novel is staging debates between characters who understand law quite
differently. While characters such as Professor Hakim and David insist on a limited version of
the law that primarily perceives the law as something that has been pre-determined and must
simply be applied to the case at hand (“playing it by the book”), other characters, such as Dr.
Rasool and Dr. Swarts, suggest that the law is malleable and that its application ought to be
determined by a number of factors, including David’s own remorse, the difference between
David’s and Melanie’s subject positions, and the historical situation in which these characters
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find themselves (49). These debates—especially when being read by a reader who is already
conflicted about their desire for both David’s and Melanie’s well-being—cause the reader to feel
disoriented throughout this section of the text, and this sense of disorientation encourages the
reader to grapple carefully with each of the different viewpoints being offered as they search for
a solution to these events that would feel in some sense “right,” despite the fact that no “right”
solution seems to exist.10
As noted, though, Disgrace also uses this section to encourage the reader to rethink their
image of law by beginning the passage with a number of statements that draw a distinction
between a limited view of law and a more expansive view of law. For instance, David states at
the beginning of the inquiry that he has “no challenge in a legal sense” but that he does have
“reservations of a philosophical kind” (45). This statement causes the reader to wonder about the
nature of David’s philosophical reservations and to ask themselves why those reservations aren’t
relevant to the inquiry at hand. This statement is then closely followed by many snippets of
dialogue that explore the difference between a trial and an enquiry, between recommendations
and sentences, and between a plea and a confession. The reader realizes, though, that the
distinction is pointless, and they thus ask themselves why the novel is drawing so much attention
to a futile question. After all, regardless of whether the committee hearing is regarded as legal or
not, its actions are still going to have a real effect on both Melanie’s and David’s lives. Thus, the
repetition of the distinction between the legal and the quasi-legal only serves to draw the reader’s
attention to the arbitrary nature of such a boundary; if, as Foucault argues, the “power to punish”
Coetzee’s tendency to write in a way that intentionally confuses his readers—and thus
forces them to slow down in their attempt to understand the implications of his language—has
been noted by a number of scholars. Jan Wilm, for instance, writes that “Coetzee’s works
activate both a figurative and a literal approach to the texts” and that “the act of reading is
slowed down and the act of reflexive responding is intensified” within most of Coetzee’s works
(Wilm 113).
10
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is now distributed throughout society—including in institutions that fragment the “legal power to
punish”—then an image of law like the one Lurie possesses allows for the majority of the law’s
power to remain masked (Foucault, Discipline 21; Will 86). By insisting upon an image of law
that views the law as a list of codified rules that could be applied to any situation and that is
inherently limited in scope, Lurie offers the reader a representation of the dogmatic image of law
and he shows how this image prevents an accurate tracing of the law’s real range of influence.
In contrast to this image, the novel presents a number of characters, but the most
influential is Dr. Farodia Rasool, the professor from the social sciences, who offers an image of
law that more closely resembles Deleuze’s notion of jurisprudence. Dr. Rasool insists on paying
attention to the case’s overtones, to its impact on the wider community, and to the “long history
of exploitation” of which the case is part (47, 49). Because Deleuzian jurisprudence places so
much emphasis on tracing the ways that a specific legal situation creates its own unique
problems for the law and on tracing the ways in which that legal situation connects to other
images—such as the image of the society or the image of historical discourses about
exploitation—it is clear that Dr. Rasool’s statements reflect a Deleuzian understanding of
jurisprudence, and they open up space for the reader to think in jurisprudential terms.
Importantly, it is Dr. Rasool who takes issue with David’s attempts to reduce the act of
jurisprudence being performed by the committee to an act that would be more aligned with the
dogmatic image of law (one which would simply attempt to apply the rules of the law to the case
at hand). In Dr. Rasool’s words, a number of important concepts in a Deleuzian image of law are
brought to the surface. For instance, consider the following passage, in which Dr. Rasool pushes
back against David’s guilty plea:
‘I want to register an objection to these responses of Professor Lurie’s, which I regard as

38

fundamentally evasive. Professor Lurie says he accepts the charges. Yet when we try to
pin him down on what it is that he actually accepts, all we get is subtle mockery. To me
that suggests that he accepts the charges only in name. In a case with overtones like this
one, the wider community is entitled—’ (48)
In this passage a number of aspects of the Deleuzian image of law are on display. There is an
insistence on working through the actual events that took place and that brought into existence
the problem at hand; there is also a resistance to identifying a specific crime and a refusal to
think in terms of recognition and subsumption; and finally, there is attention being drawn to the
ways that the law derives much of its form and power from the community in which it exists. As
Kelly notes, David’s “attempt to hide behind legal procedure in the name of the discursive purity
of the law merely highlights his disavowal of the cultural underpinnings of it,” and Dr. Rasool’s
words and comments re-establish the link between the law and the community from which it
emerges (Kelly 173).
Of course, many critics and readers of Disgrace have pointed out that this section of the
novel—and particularly the debate between David and Dr. Rasool about the difference between a
plea and a confession—could be read as a thinly veiled critique of the TRC, and this is true. It is
important, however, not to reduce this section of the novel to merely a critique of the TRC. For,
as Kelly observes, Disgrace does not merely condemn the TRC; rather, it situates the TRC
“within the multiple discourses that shape ‘the law’” (Kelly 168). In other words, while it is
certainly valuable to recognize that the novel is drawing attention to the shortcomings of the
TRC, it is also important to recognize that it is using this section to cause readers to question
their image of the law and to recognize that many different manifestations of power—including
the TRC—ought to be considered within the scope of the law, in order to accurately map the
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law’s current influence and potential.
As this section of the novel reveals, there is absolutely no distinction between the concept
that David considers to be “legal” and the influence that the committee holds. Both derive their
legitimacy from social discourse that is shaped by power relations, and this fact is further
underscored, symbolically, through the names and roles that the text assigns to each of the
committee members. These roles are not at all arbitrary, and they serve to draw the reader’s
attention to various aspects of society that Deleuze insists shape the law. These aspects include
all of the institutions and discourses that play a role in influencing the interactions that take place
between different assemblages within a given society, and they are represented by Dr. Hakim,
(David’s friend), by Dr. Rasool (from the social sciences), by Dr. Mathabane (from religious
studies), by Dr. Swarts (Dean of Engineering), by an unnamed professor from the business
school, and by a student representative from the Coalition Against Discrimination. By using
these specific characters to compose the committee that will judge David, the novel suggests that
this committee and the conversations that take place within this scene are representative of South
African society as a whole. It does so by including characters who are aligned with different
facets of society—in terms of the themes invoked by their specific areas of study (religion, social
science, business, engineering)—and in terms of the ethnic associations that are invoked by their
individual names. It then builds upon this setup by allowing each character’s opinions and ideas
to closely align with the department that they represent and by staging debates that are meant to
cause the reader to think about law less as a list of codified rules and more as a sphere of
influence that emerges from the interactions that take place between different elements of
society.
For instance, when the novel introduces Manas Mathabane, it does so by saying that
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David is “ushered in and seated at the foot of the table by Manas Mathabane himself, Professor
of Religious Studies, who will chair the inquiry” (45, emphasis added). This phrasing suggests
that Mathabane possesses a certain degree of authority, and this suggestion is underscored
throughout the section as various professors defer to Mathabane and as his statements are
delivered—unlike the statements of other characters—after a colon (such as in the statement,
“Mathabane: ‘If he is censured.’” (48)). Furthermore, Mathabane is associated with religious
authority through the first name “Manas”, a Sanskrit word that carries religious significance in
Buddhism and Hinduism (in which it describes an aspect of consciousness that separates man
from animals and correlates to objective judgment) and in Christianity (in which it invokes King
Manasseh, who reigned for fifty-five years and radically altered the legal and religious systems
of Judah). This suggestion of religious authority is also strengthened through the ways that
Hakim—who seems to choose for himself the role of David’s intermediary—whispers in
Mathabane’s ear and speaks for David before a number of decisions are announced. Finally, it
ought to be noted that, through the surname “Mathabane” (a surname that is most prevalent in
the Eastern cape), the novel ties this character’s experiences to those of other black South
Africans while also invoking the work of the South-African writer Mark Mathabane, who
become famous for his autobiography Kaffir Boy (a harsh depiction of a childhood spent in one
of South Africa’s many over-crowded townships).11 The result is a character who possesses
exactly the sort of power that was commanded by Desmond Tutu during the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission investigations—a character who draws power not from the codified
rules of the law, but rather, from all of the social discourses and communal bonds which

The inclusion of all of these references in one character is typical of Coetzee’s writing
style, and, as in other instances where this strategy is employed, it serves here to symbolically
reinforce the conversations that are literally taking place in this section (Wilm 50).
11
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converge upon his person and grant legitimacy to the decisions he makes.
This same effect is repeated with each of the other professors and institutions referenced
in the committee-hearing scene. By carefully structuring the scene to include individuals who
represent different discourses that shape the law, the passage expands the scope of the law
beyond David’s limited understanding of its powers. These discourses include the economic
influences that are represented by Dr. Swarts and by the professor from the business school, the
sociological and historical discourses that are represented by Dr. Rasool, and the religious
discourses that are represented by Dr. Mathabane. Furthermore, though, by including many
references to psychological discourses—such as the idea that David is in need of counseling—
the passage includes these discourses within its image of the forces that shape the law as well.
Finally, by including a student representative from a political-rights group (coalition against
discrimination) and many references to the ways that the media and public opinion are placing
pressure upon the committee’s decisions, the novel draws attention to the way that communal
discourse shape the law’s influence.
By using these sorts of strategies, the novel opens up space for the reader to begin asking
themselves questions about the function and purpose of the law, and this questioning is further
encouraged by one of the statements that ends this section, which occurs when David states that
Dr. Rasool’s question about his sincere feelings is “beyond the scope of the law.” This statement
prompts the reader to think about the scope of the law and about how large that scope could—or
should—be. In the face of so many different representations of power, David’s view of the law as
simply a code of rules that could be applied to the crime he either has or has not committed
seems very empty and irrelevant, and a Deleuzian image of law—as a sphere of influence that
flows forth from power relations and receives its legitimacy through social discourse—seems not
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only useful, but necessary.12
With this in mind, it becomes much easier to interpret one of the final passages in the
novel, which takes place when Lucy insists that she wants to marry Petrus and become his third
wife. To David, this idea is ludicrous. He replies that “it’s not workable” and, again, that “legally
it’s not workable,” (199, emphasis added). However, when viewed through the lens of a
Deleuzian image of law, it is clear that the idea is very much legally workable. It works because
it takes into account the communal nature of law and because it recognizes that law functions
through social discourse, including the discourses that would legitimize Lucy’s status as one of
Petrus’s wives. Thus, David’s invocation that the situation is not legally workable merely serves
to cause the reader to recognize the shortsighted nature of David’s image of law, one which is
inherently limited and which reduces law to a list of codified rules that can be applied to each
situation.
Clearly, the novel suggests, there is no set of rules that could have been applied to each of
the complex situations presented in its pages. For if there were such a set of rules—and, in fact,
there is, but the novel finds them wanting—then David would be correct in his assessment of
both situations. Both when he was a perpetrator and when his daughter was the victim, he would
have been correct to appeal to the codified rules of the law (Kelly 167). For, legally (as many of
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None of this is meant to deny the observation made by Lenta and others that the
committee-hearing scene serves to reveal Foucault’s analysis of the way that discipline currently
functions in society; it is certainly true that David’s resistance to the various forms of power
represented by the committee can be read as a resistance to the normative influence of that
power. However, just as the scene is more than a critique of the TRC, it is also more than a
critique of contemporary forms of discipline, and in fact, it situates those forms of disciplines
within the “multiple discourses that shape the law” (Lenta 5, Kelly 168). In order to read the
scene as simply a critique of the TRC or modern forms of normative discipline, it would be
necessary to read David as a heroic figure. But as has already been shown, the novel prevents
such a reading, and thus the scene becomes much more ambiguous and its references to power or
to the TRC come to serve more purpose than simple critique.
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his fellow faculty members make clear) David has not committed a crime in his relations with
Melanie; and legally (as David insists to everyone who will listen) Lucy is in the right to report
her rape to the police and to seek the punishment of her rapists. And yet it is quite clear—due to
a thoughtful consideration of the harm that either has or could be done in each of these
situations—that neither of these scenarios are meant to be acceptable to reader. Thus, the idea of
law as a codified set of rules that can be applied to any situation is called into question. And,
furthermore, as the reader engages in the process of thinking through these two situations, the
idea of law as a creative act of jurisprudence is reinforced.
By forcing the reader to think about law in these ways, the novel leads readers to reflect
on the question of how law comes into existence. Of course, according to the dogmatic image,
the answer to this question takes the form of a number of abstractions—about judges, about
legislators, about democratic discourse, about social contracts—none of which correspond to the
immanent reality of real life. But Disgrace offers another way of thinking about the way that law
is brought into existence. In the pages of this novel, the image is created of jurisprudential
processes that are carried out by various subjects as they enter into interactions with one another.
These interactions, of course, are influenced by the law, but they are not determined by the rules
of the law, and through such interactions, the characters in Disgrace cause certain legal
discourses to become more legitimate while making other legal discourses less legitimate. In this
way, the sphere of the law is altered; in a very real way, the law’s power and the law’s functions
are affected by the interactions that take place between subjects within its sphere of influence.
In the next chapter of this thesis, these interactions will be explored further. There, it will
be shown that Disgrace helps readers to think more about processes of becoming and less about
notions of rights. In doing so, the novel moves readers further away from a dogmatic image of
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law, one that relies upon transcendental notions that are inadequate for addressing the complex
demands of life, and toward an image of law that concerns itself with immanent situations.
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Chapter Two
Rights in Disgrace: Transcendence & Immanence
One of the more interesting—though often overlooked—aspects of Disgrace is the fact
David spends much of his time either working on or thinking about the opera that he is writing
about the life of Lord Byron. Through this opera, the reader is granted a level of insight into
David’s mind that they do not experience even when reading David’s own internal thoughts. The
reason for this is that David’s thoughts in the novel are extremely contradictory, prone to change,
inconsistent, and—more often than not—delivered in the form of questions that David is asking
himself in an attempt to understand the changes he is experiencing. The opera, on the other hand,
provides David with a space to create characters and relationships that reflect his understanding
of the world, and as that understanding changes over the course of the novel, so too, does the
opera.
When David first envisions the opera, he imagines that it will be “a chamber play about
love and death,” one that is backed by “a complex, restless music” to which Byron can add his
“dark, convoluted lyrics” to reflect on the end of passion and an embrace of death. By the end of
the story, though, the opera has transformed entirely. Byron is now completely absent. In fact, he
is long dead, and his story is being told by a middle-aged Teresa, who is now “a dumpy little
widow installed in the Villa Gamba with her aged father” (177). The complex orchestral music,
too, has been replaced, and the only music that remains is that which is produced by Teresa on a
small, tinny banjo. Alongside Teresa, there are now two other voices as well: that of a howling
dog and that of Byron’s daughter, Allegra, whose voice “cuts insistently across the voice of the
lovers” (181). The result is an opera that is no longer about abstract ideas and values but, rather,
one that is rooted in the real emotions, experiences, and struggles of actual life (Tegla 222-223).
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The transformation of David’s opera underscores a transformation that is central to both
Disgrace and to Deleuze’s philosophy: the difference between transcendence and immanence.
According to Deleuze, the dominant tendency in Western philosophy has been to think in terms
of transcendental ideas. This tendency is strongly critiqued in Difference and Repetition, where
Deleuze engages at length with both Aristotle and Kant. In terms of Aristotle, he argues that
Aristotle’s conceptual differences misrepresent the way that difference actually works—as
“difference as such” rather than as “difference between”—and he argues that this can easily be
observed in Aristotle’s attempts to isolate, identify, and categorize different individual entities
(Lefebvre, Image of Law, 62) . In terms of Kant, Deleuze argues that Kant’s belief in a
“transcendent category of recognition” leads the German philosopher to ascribe to certain
faculties uses beyond their limits. For Deleuze, on the other hand, a given faculty’s use is always
immanently related to its interactions with other faculties, and difference exists within all
assemblages, in different ways and to different degrees (Williams 2570).
In order to better understand Deleuze’s beliefs about Western philosophy’s tendency to
think in abstractions, it is helpful to turn to Paul Patton’s essay “Immanence, Transcendence, and
the Creation of Rights.” In this essay, Patton explains that a “refusal of transcendence” remains a
constant motif in all of Deleuze’s works, and he further explains that this applies to all realms—
to all “values, concepts of history, or human nature”—and that Deleuze’s “thought renounces all
forms of appeal to transcendent values…in favour of a radical immanence” (15).13 This radical
immanence means that—for Deleuze—the focus is always placed on understanding an
13

Of course, this is not to dismiss the fact that Deleuze often writes about the
transcendent nature of problems, such as when he writes: “The problem is at once transcendent
and immanent in relation to its solutions. Transcendent, because it consists in a system of ideal
liaisons or differential relations between generic elements. Immanent, because these liaisons or
relations are incarnated in the actual relations which do not resemble them and are defined by the
field of solutions” (DR, 212).
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assemblage in terms of its “own unsteady relations” rather than in accordance to any sort of
“universal substance” (Williams 4046). This, however, should not suggest that Deleuze is a
pragmatist; his philosophy, after all, engages heavily with non-existent possibilities for becoming
(the virtual). Rather, the point to be made is that Deleuze rejects thinking in terms of
transcendental categories and notions in favor of exploring actual interactions and changes—
both those that currently exist and those that are possible—between various assemblages. And
this holds true for law as well. As Claire Colebrooke explains:
Deleuze and Guattari challenge the transcendence of law and they do this both
through an actual history that traces the genesis of law, and then through an analysis
of what they refer to as ‘social and desiring machines’, arguing for modes of
operation irreducible to the transcendent concept of law. Second, and through a theory
of the virtual, Deleuze discloses an entirely other, immanent, vital and more positive
conception of jurisprudence. (15-16)
In the previous chapter, great attention was paid to the ways that both Deleuze and Disgrace
encourage their readers to think of law as jurisprudence; in this chapter, attention will be paid to
the way that both Deleuze and Disgrace also encourage their readers to think of law in terms of
immanent relations. It will do so, first, by exploring how Disgrace stages situations that are
“irreducible to the transcendent concept of law,” and then, secondly, by considering how the text
asks readers to think of its characters as “social and desiring machines.”
Before turning full attention to Disgrace, though, it is worth pausing to consider one
more set of Deleuze’s thoughts on transcendence, simply because they are so directly related to
the discourses that take place within Disgrace. These comments can be found in Deleuze’s nowinfamous interview with Claire Parnet, in which he was asked to elaborate on his feelings about

48

human rights. In this interview, Deleuze appears to struggle. He is hesitant and pauses between
statements, searching for the right words, no doubt aware that his thoughts could easily be taken
out of context. Still, he ends up relating human rights to “impotent thought” (penée molle),
carried out by imbeciles (débiles), and yet he appears frustrated that it is impossible to resist this
impotent thought because any attempt to do so leads one to hold “detestable positions” (‘on a
envie de devenir, de tenir des propos odieux’) (Lefebvre, “Human Rights in Deleuze”, 48).
In other places, this frustration with the impotent thought of human-rights discourses is
developed further. Deleuze says that, “If you’re talking about reconstituting transcendence or
universals, restoring reflective subject as the bearer of rights, or setting up a communicative
intersubjectivity, then [human rights are] not much of a philosophical advance (invention
philosophique)” (Lefebvre, “Human Rights in Deleuze” 50). He also says that “Human rights say
nothing about the immanent modes of existence of people provided with rights” and that they
“suppose a universal and abstract subject of rights, identified with no one in particular and
irreducible to singular, existent figures’” (Lefebvre, “Human Rights in Deleuze” 51). Finally,
Deleuze argues that it is “in the name of all this [abstract logic] that thinking’s fettered, that any
analysis in terms of movement is blocked” (Lefebvre, The Image of Law 55).
At a later point in this chapter, great attention will be devoted to exploring Deleuze’s
claim that human rights discourses inhibit new becomings. For now, though, it is sufficient to
recognize that Deleuze rejects human rights for the same reasons he rejects other abstract
philosophical notions: they turn the focus away from immanence and toward transcendence; they
make all situations—and all subjects—interchangeable with one another; they serve as axioms
that prevent thought from occurring; and they blind subjects to harm of their own making
(Lefebvre, “Human Rights”, 51). These reasons for rejecting transcendence are also at work
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within Disgrace (and, for that matter, in most of Coetzee’s other works as well).14
In Disgrace, the rejection of transcendence can be seen in the differences that exist
between David and Lucy. These differences—which are not only present, but are also magnified
by the novel’s plot and phrasing—offer the reader an opportunity to think at length about the
difference between living in a transcendental way and an immanent way, due to the fact that
David is almost always thinking in transcendental terms, while Lucy is almost always thinking in
terms of immanent relations.
Within the first few pages of Disgrace, it is made extremely clear to the reader that David
is a character who navigates the world in terms of transcendental values. For example, the reader
is told that “intercourse between Soraya and himself must be, he imagines, rather like the
copulation of snakes: lengthy, absorbed, but rather abstract, rather dry, even at its hottest” (2).
Through lines such as these, the reader gains insight into David’s mind, and they are made to
realize that, for David, events—such as sex—become meaningful only through their relationship
to abstract ideals. As Moreover, these thoughts are repeated over and over again throughout the
first chapter. In this chapter, the reader is told that David believes the origins of speech lie not in
practical needs for human animals to communicate their “thoughts, feelings and intentions” to
one another, but rather, “in song” and that “the origins of song [lie] in the need to fill out with
sound the overlarge and rather empty human soul” (3). Similarly, when David experiences sex or
difficulties with sex, he navigates these emotions not through consideration of the actual
situations in which he is involved, but through reflections on cultural mythologies, such as the
story of Emma Bovary or the legends or Origen (4, 8). And when David decides he wants to hire
Soraya to have sex with him, the reader is told that he makes this choice because she is listed by
As David Attwell notes to Coetzee during an interview in Doubling the Point: “Your
narrators play out the failure of the Cartesian self to reach transcendence” (26).
14
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the agency as an “exotic” (6), and it is made clear—through descriptions of her physical body
and the ideas that David associates with that body—that it is the idea of her that David desires.
This point is reinforced when David’s desire for Soraya wears off, after he glimpses her in
public, with her two small children, denying him the arousal he was able to gain from the
abstract notion. Finally, the chapter underscores this idea even further, by offering an example of
David’s sexual encounters with another human—a secretary from his office—who exhibits clear
signs of sexual arousal and bodily response, but whose “bucking and clawing” only serves to
repel David (9). Through all of these examples, the same point is made: when David’s
transcendental notions are brought into contact with real-world, concrete realities, he always
escapes back into the realm of ideas.
Now, if this attachment to romantic ideals was simply a part of David’s personality—and
if no harm resulted from this attachment—then it would not be worth elaborating much on this
aspect of his character. However, this is not the case. As the text reveals, David’s tendency to
retreat into the world of ideas causes great harm to others, and moreover, it blinds him to the
ways that his actions are responsible for that harm. As has been previously noted, the text uses
Lucy’s rape to cause the reader to rethink their assessment of the events that took place between
David and Melanie and to recognize that Melanie suffered significant harm through her
interactions with David. Another section in which this point is stressed takes place near the end
of the novel, when David attends a play in which Melanie is performing. As Jack Dudley points
out, this scene is established in a way that mimics the modernist usage of an epiphanic moment,
utilizing extremely stylized prose to describe a commonplace occurrence, and culminating in a
moment when David asks himself—as he watches Melanie perform—“If he is being led, then
what god is doing the leading?” (188; Dudley 119). Immediately after this question occurs to
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him, though—and just as he seems to be on the verge of finding an answer—a spitball hits him
in the back of the head.
This humorous refusal to grant epiphanic insight not only underscores the novel’s
insistence on immanence, but it also reveals the degree to which David’s thoughts have
consistently misled not only himself, but also the reader. Because the scene features such high
levels of reflexivity and expectation, the reader who is exposed to it for the first time, really does
feel that something significant is about to happen. After all, as David is sitting in his seat, a
number of things happen: he asks for a sign to tell him what to do; he experiences a vision—a
“stream of images” that pours down around him—of all the women he has known on two
continents; he reaches out toward Melanie, with his soul, across twenty rows of empty seats,
wondering if she can “smell his thoughts”; and he thinks to himself about the ways that both he
and Melanie have been changed for the better by their interactions with one another (186).
And then a spit ball hits him in the head and an answer is provided: Melanie’s
interactions with David did not enrich her at all. In fact, as Melanie’s boyfriend tells David once
they are both outside together, Melanie would spit in his eye if she saw him at that moment
(189). The clash between this immanent awareness—that Melanie wants nothing to do with him
at all—and the transcendental ideas David had been fostering a moment before—that she would
want to smell his thoughts from across the theatre—is so shocking to David that he immediately
leaves the theatre, drives into town, and pays a girl younger than Melanie to have sex with him.
Thus, the novel moves the reader in two very important directions via this one scene: first,
because of the way it mocks David’s transcendental ideals, it moves the reader away from
thinking in terms of ideas and towards thinking in terms of concrete realities; and second,
because of the way it reveals Melanie’s disgust for David in clear and stark terms, it forces the
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reader to recognize the fact that David’s transcendental thoughts have prevented him—and, by
extension, the reader—from seeing the harm that was done to Melanie through his interactions
with her. Because David’s transcendental notion of justice is based on a belief in individual
rights that either are or are not violated, he concludes that if a right has not been violated (i.e. if
what happened between two people was “not rape, not quite”), then an injustice has not occurred
(Coetzee, Disgrace 21). But this is exactly the sort of thinking that Deleuze criticizes when he
criticizes human-rights discourses: they blind subjects to harm of their own making; they cause
subjects to overlook the immanent problems that arise from a given situation; and they cause
violation to be viewed as either something that has occurred or as something that has not
occurred, rather than as a spectrum in which varying degrees of harm may take place without any
specific rules necessarily being violated.
Through its depiction of David’s character, Disgrace repeatedly draws attention to the
ways that transcendental notions prevent subjects from understanding the specific nature of a
situation in which they are involved. Moreover, it also encourages the reader to think about the
ways that such notions limit the degree to which subjects can change and enter into new
becomings. However, the novel’s treatment of these ideas is not limited merely to its depiction of
David’s worldview. In just as much color, the novel presents Lucy and her worldview, and it is
through the juxtaposition of these two characters that Disgrace performs its real exploration of
the differences between a transcendental understanding of the world and an immanent one.
In Lucy, the reader experiences a character who speaks and acts and navigates her life in
ways that are completely opposed to the ways in which David does the same, and this difference
is made very clear to the reader as soon as they are introduced to her as a character. In the first
scene in which she is included, Lucy is portrayed as being intimately connected with the earth.
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She is constantly barefoot; she is in touch with the land on which she lives; and she displays
considerable knowledge of the plants she grows and of the natural cycles that take place
throughout her farm. The result of these depictions is to cause the reader to feel a sharp
distinction between the way that Lucy lives and the way that David lives; the former is
constantly connected to concrete reality, while the latter is constantly absorbed in the world of
ideas. And this distinction only becomes more pronounced in the chapters that follow.
In chapter nine, for instance, David and Lucy engage in an extensive debate about South
African history, self-improvement, animal consciousness, the purpose of life, and the existence
of souls. At one point during this debate, David compares animal-welfare people (such as Bev
and Bill Shaw) to “Christians of a certain kind,” to which Lucy responds by stating that she can
sense David’s expectations that she ought to be doing something “better” with her life than
existing on the farm. She says that he doesn’t “‘approve of friends like Bev and Bill Shaw
because they are not going to lead me to a higher life,’” and when David denies this fact, Lucy
insists that it is true, saying: “‘They are not going to lead me to a higher life, and the reason is,
there is no higher life’” (72). And it is to this idea that David firmly objects. Up until this point,
he had been denying Lucy’s claims about his internal thoughts; he had been denying that he
expects her to do great things with her life or that he doesn’t like her friends (both of which, of
course, are false denials, and because the reader has been privy to David’s thoughts, they realize
that these denials are completely false; David does expect his daughter to do better things with
her life, and he does reject her friends in his own mind). He is unable, however, to deny that he
believes in a “higher life,” one that includes a purpose beyond the earthly experiences of human
life and one that is separate from the sorts of lives that nonhuman animals lead. Thus, at this
early point in the novel, Lucy is associated with immanent, concrete existence, while David is
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associated with transcendental, abstract existence.
This association is then further underscored at other places in the novel. When David and
Lucy are taking a walk together, for instance, David asks Lucy if “this”—the garden and the
house and the farm on the Eastern Cape—is what she wants in life, to which Lucy simply
responds: “‘It will do’” (67). This focus on “what will do” in life strikes the reader as
significantly different from David’s constant obsession with the most ideal way to live life and
with his focus on what others will decide about the life he has lived. Similarly, when David
insists, after the rape, that Lucy go somewhere else—that she allow him to pay for her to move to
Holland or to Cape Town—Lucy responds that she is going to continue to live on the farm. Of
course, David is unable to understand this response, and he insists that continuing to live on the
farm is “not safe” and “not a good idea,” to which Lucy responds: “‘I’m not going back for the
sake of an idea. I’m just going back’” (102). This distinction between acting “for the sake of an
idea” or of acting in some other—though often undefined—way is raised frequently throughout
the novel, making it difficult for the reader to ignore. For example, a few pages later, when
David asks Lucy if she is attempting to correct the wrongs of history by suffering in the present,
Lucy replies: “‘No. You keep misreading me. Guilt and salvation are abstractions. I don’t act in
terms of abstractions’” (109-10). Because this statement that Lucy doesn’t “act in terms of
abstractions” ends the conversation, the reader is left to wonder about the terms by which Lucy
does act. Furthermore, because Lucy’s actions are often perplexing to the reader and because the
reasons she takes these actions is never explicitly explained—it is only presented as not “for the
sake of an idea”—the question about how she determines the best way to act is continually thrust
upon the reader, prompting them to think about the distinction between acting in accordance with
transcendental ideals and some other way of acting.
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This question becomes difficult for the reader to ignore shortly after Lucy is raped, when
she insists to David that, as far as she is concerned, what happened to her was “a purely private
matter,” and when she says that “in another time, in another place, it might be held to be a public
matter” but that “in this place, at this time, it is not” (108). Lucy is aware that, in the context of
post-apartheid South Africa, any attempts she might take to seek punishment for her rapists
would result in the reinforcement of racist discourses about the rape of white women by black
men. As Carine Mardorossian writes:
If she presses charges, the gendered dimension of the rape will immediately be
recuperated by a racially motivated reading and reify social hierarchies that have
historically been produced precisely through the link between rape and the
construction of race. As historians have shown, the way rape has been brought to the
public’s attention since the nineteenth century has primarily been through racism.
(75)
As Lucy’s actions in this section of the novel reveal, she is aware of the way that racist
discourses have converged upon the notion of rape, making it impossible for her story to ever be
separated from the racism that marks her society. And the novel, too, seems interested in
exploring this point, as is revealed by its juxtaposition of the two acts of sexual violation against
one another. By asking readers to think about the similarities and differences between the two
situations—and by asking readers to recognize their own willingness to see David’s interactions
with Melanie as “not rape, not quite”—the novel invites reconsideration of the discursive
influence that is occupied by the concept of rape. More specifically, it asks the reader to
recognize the fact that the term is quickly assigned to any sexual violation of white women that
involves black men, but that it is far more rarely assigned to situations that involve white men as
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the perpetrators of the violation (Mardorossian 74) In this way, Disgrace once again presses its
readers to recognize the limitations of forms of thought that only seek to assign guilt or
innocence based on the criteria thought to be necessary in order for a certain crime to have
occurred.
It is worth noting here that many critics have condemned Disgrace for the way in which
it seems to suggest that Lucy’s choice to remain silent is born out of white-guilt and a desire to
atone for the sins of South Africa’s racist past (Mardorossian 72-73). However, it must be
recognized that this interpretation of Lucy’s motivations is put forth by David, not by Lucy. Lucy
is not, as David puts it, “‘expiat[ing] the crimes of the past by suffering in the present’” (112).
Rather, she is refusing to participate in the racist discourses that surround rape. As Gayatri
Chakravorty Spivak puts it, Lucy’s response to the rape allows her to refuse “to be raped” (qtd.
in Mardorossian 77). Lucy refuses to legitimize the notion of rape because she recognizes that
racist discourses have converged upon the legal category “rape,” shaping it into a concept that
can do nothing to alleviate the pain she is experiencing but that can cause a great deal of pain in
the lives of others. As Mardorossian writes:
Seen in this light, Lucy’s refusal to seek legal reparation is not an extension of her
‘refusal to resist’ so much as of her resistance against a legal machinery that poses as
neutral arbiter between incriminated and isolated individuals in a context of collective
violence it was historically instrumental in creating. (76-77)
In refusing to speak about her violation, Lucy is not simply refusing justice; she is refusing a
certain type of justice, one which has been made to seem legitimate through a long history of
discourse and which has already caused a great deal of suffering. For Lucy, justice must be
sought out within a given situation, and it must take into account the past, the present, and the
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future, as well as all of the variables that make a particular situation unique from all others. For
Lucy, the idea of a certain rule or right being violated means nothing at all because the rules and
rights cannot be made to fit the concrete situation with which she is dealing.
Once again, this aspect of the text takes on greater meaning when read in the light of
Deleuze’s philosophy of law, which insists on elevating discourses that trace and articulate
actual, immanent realities and on downplaying discourses that rely on transcendental notions,
such as human rights. In this light, it is clear why David’s insistence on rights throughout the
novel seems so problematic and why Lucy’s insistence on understanding the actual situation—
and on asking questions about how harm might by mitigated, moving forward from a specific
situation—proves to be extremely productive. Furthermore, Deleuze’s philosophy about rights
helps to make intelligible other sections of the novel that explore the idea of rights in ways that
are initially confusing for the reader. For example, when David chooses to defend himself
regarding his actions with Melanie, one of the phrases he uses is the phrase “rights of desire,”
and when the reader is first exposed to this phrase, it is likely to strike them as inherently
problematic, even if they can’t explain why. I would like to suggest, though, that Deleuze’s
thoughts on both rights and desire provide a fruitful lens for understanding not only this phrase,
but also many other sections of the novel that are thematically related to it.
In Deleuze’s writings, the term desire means far more than it does in ordinary parlance.
For Deleuze, desire does not arise from lack (in the Freudian/Lacanian sense). Rather, desire
simply happens. It is its own affect (one which arises from certain connections that take place
amongst assemblages), and it is an affect that produces other affects within other assemblages.
Remember that, for Deleuze, there is no such thing as a desiring individual; rather, there are only
desiring assemblages, which form from the overlap of certain intensities and which are always in
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the process of changing. For example, the orchid can rightly be thought of as an assemblage. The
wasp can also be thought of as an assemblage. More importantly, though, the orchid-wasp can
also be thought of as an assemblage, and it is no less an assemblage than either the orchid or the
wasp (Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus 12). Furthermore, the desire that brought into
existence the orchid-wasp is an essential aspect of the orchid-wasp assemblage (Deleuze and
Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus 215).
In this same way, whenever desire occurs within an assemblage—such as the assemblage
that is David Lurie—it is always in relation to certain connections and certain new becomings
that are taking place. As Deleuze and Guattari write in A Thousand Plateaus: “Desire is never
separable from complex assemblages” (Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus 215).
Moreover, desire is far more than an animalistic urge; it is “never an undifferentiated instinctual
energy” but rather is the result of “a highly developed, engineered setup rich in interactions”
(Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus 215). Once again, it is helpful here to think of the
orchid-wasp assemblage. Various aspects of this assemblage (the assemblage that is the orchid,
the assemblage that is the wasp, the assemblage that is the pollen, the assemblage that is one
organ of the wasp’s body, and so on) are each engaging with desire. As the map of the orchidwasp continually changes, so too does the orchid; its flowers come to resemble the female
genitalia of the female wasp, while the wasp’s bodily responses continue to change in relation to
the flowers (Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus 12).
Given this profoundly relational understanding of desire, it is fascinating to turn to David
Lurie’s use of the word in Disgrace. When he uses the term the rights of desire, Lurie seems to
suggest that he was simply responding—in accord with his Romantic heroes—to his bodily
passions. He was not thinking; he was simply desiring. And, on its face, this defense almost
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makes sense to the reader. After all, David is essentially arguing that he was acting in accordance
with his bodily needs and that he cannot be faulted for doing so. However, by tying the term
right to David’s idea of desire, the text is able to construct a phrase—rights of desire—that
strikes the reader as inherently wrong (even upon their first exposure to it), though it is difficult
to explain precisely why the term is wrong. I would like to suggest, however, that the answer to
this question is revealed quite plainly by Deleuze’s philosophy.
Remember that, for Deleuze, rights are inherently minimalistic and universally applicable
to all subjects. They are only ascribed to those things that could be considered (in a
transcendental sense) to belong to everyone, and thus, they are never capable of producing new
becomings or new connections. Even worse—from a Deleuzian standpoint—notions of rights
prevent such connections from occurring because they reinforce false perceptions of the
existence of autonomous individuals whose rights could be violated. (Of course, Deleuze’s point
here is not at all to say that harm cannot be done via actions that are conventionally regarded as
“rights-violating” but, rather, to insist that “rights-violating” is the wrong way to think of the
harm that was done.) When this understanding of rights is placed alongside Deleuze’s
understanding of desire—as a force that can only be understood in relation to connection and
transformation—then it is clear that the term “rights of desire” is an oxymoron; it creates a
paradox, and the ironic nature of this paradox draws attention to the limitations of rights-based
discourses.
There are a number of reasons why this phrase—“rights of desire”—is able to stick with
the reader and to capture so succinctly many of the tensions that are present within the text. The
first reason is simply because the idea of rights plays such a prominent role in Disgrace. Over
and over again throughout the novel, concepts of rights are invoked. However, whenever they are
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invoked, something within the text—either the nature of the specific right, or its explicit
denunciation, or the tone of the language used to discuss it, or David’s belief that it is
illegitimate—makes it difficult for the reader to conclude that the right is being presented in an
entirely sincere way.15 Usually, the reader senses that the right being invoked is being called into
question in some way. And because this effect is created so often throughout the text, the reader
is always aware that the text is conducting some sort of exploration of the limits of rights-based
logic.
Alongside this awareness, though, the reader is also continually aware that the novel is
grappling with issues of desire. Of course, the reader is unlikely to think of it in those terms, but
they are nonetheless likely to perceive that the novel is investigating the ways in which desire—
as a force that creates connections, fosters new becomings, resists stasis—is at work within the
text. After all, throughout much of the early part of the text David is largely defined by his
resistance to this type of desire. In the first few chapters of Disgrace, David is not able to enter
into connections with anyone. He is thoroughly himself, and he is completely resistant to the idea
of change. He insists on thinking in terms of what people are rather than in terms of what they
are becoming. He thinks of what a man like him is; what a Lucy is; what a Bev is; what his own
temperament is. In fact, this sense of a permanent temperament is so important to David, that the
term occurs within his internal monologues nine times in the first three pages of the text, and
15

The following is just a partial list of some of the points in the novel when rights are
invoked problematically: when David suggests that perhaps the young have a right to be
protected from seeing their elders in the throes of passion (42); when David is told that he has a
right to challenge the makeup of the committee (45); when David insists that he has the right to
make a plea regarding his guilt or innocence (49); when the novel discusses Petrus’ right to come
and go as he pleases (114); when David asks Pollux by what right he is on Lucy’s land (128);
when Lucy claims she has a right not to need to justify herself (129); and when Lucy denounces
her rights at the end of the text (200); by using the language of rights in each of these unrelated
situations, the novel sets up a refrain that encourages the reader to think more deeply about the
effects and limitations of rights-based discourses.
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always the underlying idea is that one’s temperament is impervious to change.
Thus, even though David invokes the idea of pleasure as a defense for his actions, there is
a clear lack of desire—in the Deleuzian sense—in his life. Remember that, for Deleuze, to
reduce desire to either animalistic urges or Freudian/Lacanian lack is to miss the point. Desire it
not about simply wanting something that one does not yet have, nor is it the type of desire that
David seems to invoke when he talks about “rights of desire,” namely a sexual need that builds
up in the body and is then eradicated momentarily through sex. For Deleuze, following Spinoza,
desire is always productive and always defined by relationship. As Brent Adkins explains,
Spinoza’s desire does not arise out of a lack. Rather, desire should be thought of as
entering into combinations with other modes such that our ability to affect and be
affected is increased rather than diminished. Understood in this way, Spinoza’s ethical
project consists in showing that entering into some combinations increases one’s
ability (virtue, power, potentia), and that entering into other combinations decreases
one’s ability. (1898)
In this light, it is clear that, despite David’s image of himself as a person who is full of
passionate desire, he is actually a character who has become quite prevented from experiencing
desire in the sense that Deleuze and Spinoza discuss. He is a character whose life offers very few
opportunities for anything new to take place. He believes himself incapable of change and he
intentionally prevents himself from entering into any new connections with anyone. Once again,
though, it is important to notice that Disgrace does not simply seem to suggest that the problem
for David is a problem of personal ethics. Rather, by continually portraying David as a character
who thinks in terms of individualistic rights, the novel draws attention to the ways that an image
of law constructs the subjectivities of those who adhere to that image. When considering David’s
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life—and especially when considering his resistance to change and connection—it makes perfect
sense that he would embrace an image of law that places great emphasis on the role of
individualistic rights. However, it is also possible to say the opposite: to say that the image of
law that is dominant in David’s society has constructed David so that he is incapable of
experiencing change and connection. In fact, this is not only possible, but it also suggested by the
overall arc of the story, and in order to understand why this is so, it is necessary to once again
consider Lucy, the character in Disgrace who seems to serve as foil to many of David’s
experiences regarding both rights and desire.
As has already been demonstrated, the novel depicts Lucy as a character who focuses on
immanent reality and not on transcendental ideas. It also presents her as a person who is
constantly experiencing desire in the way that Deleuze uses the term, and the two depictions are
not unrelated. Just as David is shown to be shaped by the image of law that dominates his
society—one that is extremely dependent on rights-based logic—Lucy is shown to be shaped by
her resistance to that image. In fact, one of the most frequently cited lines of the entire novel is
one in which Lucy explicitly denounces her own rights, saying that what she wants is to start
over again, with nothing, “no cards, no weapons, no property, no rights, no dignity” (200). This
line tells the reader explicitly that one of the major differences between David and Lucy is their
response to notions of rights, thus tying the ethical explorations that take place within the text to
notions of law. Furthermore, by drawing attention to Lucy’s disavowal of rights at this point in
the text—just after she has told David that she wants to marry Petrus—Disgrace creates a
connection between Lucy’s ability to enter into new connections and the disavowal of her rights.
In order to understand why this is so significant, though, it is necessary to consider the passage
that precedes this point in closer detail.
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Merely a moment before Lucy disavows her rights, an exchange takes place between
Petrus and David in which Petrus tells David that he intends to marry Lucy, despite the fact that
he already has two wives. In response to this suggestion, David becomes enraged, but he
nevertheless does tell Lucy about Petrus’s offer, and much to his surprise, she is responsive to the
idea. In fact, as she discusses the different possibilities that it presents—which include her ability
to keep the house and the kennels and to raise her unborn child as part of Petrus’s household—
her tone suggests some hope again about the future, and this hope is very significant because
hope has been missing from Lucy’s portrayal since the rape took place. Prior to the rape, Lucy is
depicted as being constantly busy and relatively happy. She takes care of her dogs, grows
flowers, interacts warmly with local clients at the farmer’s market, and often makes jokes and
teases David lightheartedly. After the rape, however, all of this ends. Lucy is no longer presented
as being lighthearted, and she now performs the activities that once brought her joy in a
mechanical and sad way. As she tells David in a letter, “I am a dead person and I do not know yet
what will bring me back to life” (157).
This idea of being a dead person is a regular motif throughout Disgrace, and it is worth
considering the ways that this motif comes to bear on the work the text is doing with ideas about
rights, desire, connections, and law. Over ten different times, the text refers to Melanie, Lucy, or
David as being dead. It also, however, refers to Teresa—the main character in David’s revised
opera—as a character who will “not be dead” (141, emphasis added). And it constantly uses the
language of death to describe the dogs that play such a major thematic role throughout the text.
Certainly, all of these invocations of death (and especially the depictions of living characters who
are described as being dead) are meaningful within the story, but it is not entirely clear how the
reader ought to interpret these descriptions. I would like to suggest, however, that an answer can

64

be found when thinking about these descriptions in the light of Deleuze’s ideas about desire and
potential.
Because Deleuze values the ability to enter into new connections or to participate in new
becomings, he is especially critical of forces that would prevent such connections from taking
place or that would limit a subject’s potential. In Disgrace, there a number of these forces at
work, but one of the dominant ones is the image of law that pervades the background of the text
and that is shown to play a major role in constituting subjects such as David. By presenting
David as a character who is thoroughly constituted by notions of individual rights and
transcendental values—and by also presenting him as a character who is incapable of
experiencing change or connection—the novel calls into question the image of law that relies so
heavily upon such ideas. At the same time, though, the novel presents Lucy, a character who is
defined by her resistance to the transcendental values and rights-based logic that underlie
David’s worldview. For Lucy, there is never an option to turn to the law because the law—as it
exists in her society—can do nothing to fix the immanent problems of the situation in which she
is living. Yes, as David points out, she could turn to the police and seek punishment for Pollux,
but this does not seem like a viable option to Lucy, though the reasons why it is not a viable
option are not made at all clear to the reader. In fact, the text actually draws attention to the
question of why Lucy is making the choices she makes, thus encouraging the reader to search for
an answer for themselves. By elevating the question in this way, the text makes it very likely that
the reader will begin to think about the differences between David’s idea of law and Lucy’s idea
of law, two distinct perspectives that capture the contrast between an image of law that
emphasizes notions of rights and an image of law that emphasizes the need to increase a
subject’s potential.
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It is important to remember that all of these explorations of the limits of rights-based
discourses are unfolding within the context of a society that has just recently separated itself
from the legal institution of apartheid, which functioned by denying rights to the vast majority of
the people living within South Africa. Because the novel frequently reminds the reader that it is
taking place just after this transition, Lucy’s renunciation of rights calls into question the belief
that granting rights to people who were previously denied those rights will do anything to
address the immanent problems they are facing. Because rights-based logic doesn’t take into
account the unequal distributions of power that shape interactions amongst subjects, it can do
nothing to create the type of society that Lucy desires. Moreover—and as the novel continually
makes clear—nothing about the problems Lucy is facing would be improved by seeking
punishment for Pollux. Even if Pollux were punished, nothing would change for Lucy; she would
still be stuck in the state of death-in-life in which she found herself after the rape, and by seeking
punishment for Pollux, Lucy would actually be preventing herself from entering into any of the
new connections that she ultimately desires. Once again, it is important to note that the text
draws great attention to the fact that the dogmatic image of law—which David invokes when
talking to Lucy about how her marriage is not legally workable—would prevent Lucy from
entering into the connections that lead her to new becomings. This is significant because it shows
how the text is interested in revealing the limitations of an image of law that seeks to regulate
how individuals may not act toward one another—as chiefly enshrined in discourses about
individual rights—rather than in removing the barriers that prevent subjects from entering into
new becomings.
In the scene in which David and Lucy discuss her marriage to Petrus, the dogmatic image
of law is called into question through a very nuanced set of transitions and juxtapositions. First, it

66

is made clear that the notion of marrying Petrus causes Lucy to feel some level of hope about her
future. Then, it is made clear that the law—as it currently exists—would prevent such a marriage
from occurring. But Lucy dismisses this notion and exhibits a resolve to act in accordance with a
different image of law, one that derives its legitimacy from the cultural norms of the Eastern
Cape. And, finally, Lucy’s desire to act in accordance with this image is tied to a renunciation of
her rights. Thus, it is suggested that in order for new connections and becomings to take place,
many aspects of the dogmatic image of law—especially its emphasis on individual rights—must
be called into question and, moreover, that ideas which allow for greater connections and
increases in potential must be granted greater legitimacy.
For those familiar with Coetzee’s life and work, none of this will come as a surprise.
After all, in his 1987 Jerusalem Prize Acceptance Speech, Coetzee made it very clear that he has
strong feelings about forms of law that prevent connections from taking place between subjects.
As he says,
In the early 1950s, the heady years when the great city of apartheid was still being
built, a law was passed making sexual relations between masters and slaves a crime.
This was the most pointed of a long string of laws regulating all phases of social life,
whose intent was to block forms of horizontal intercourse between white and black.
The only sanctioned intercourse was henceforth to be vertical; that is, it was to consist
in giving and receiving orders. (Coetzee, Doubling, 96-97)
For Coetzee, the ways in which law can prevent connections from taking place between different
subjects in a “horizontal” (i.e. equal) manner is deeply disturbing. And this is also true for
Deleuze. However, both authors seem concerned not only with how law can prevent connections
from taking place amongst subjects, but also with how—in accordance with the dogmatic
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image—it is often assumed to primarily function by doing so.
As Disgrace reveals through its depiction of David Lurie’s thoughts regarding law, it is
quite common to think of the law, first and foremost, as a system that protects individual rights
by limiting the ways in which subjects may act toward one another. Because of this, law is often
regarded as a force that prevents change from taking place rather than as a force that causes
change to occur. There is, however, no reason that this ought to be the case, especially because,
in many ways, it isn’t even true. As Foucault first pointed out, law—as a manifestation of
power—is an inherently productive force. It operates by producing, not by limiting.16 The
dogmatic image of law, however, blinds most subjects to this fact. While it is certainly true that
many aspects of law do, in fact, limit the degree to which subjects may interact with one another,
this is not an inherent component of law; instead, it is merely the product of certain power
relations that have produced such limitations, to the benefit of certain subjects and to the
detriment of others.17
As Lucy’s actions at the end of Disgrace make clear, though, law is also capable of
increasing opportunities for new becomings and of decreasing impediments to flows or
As Foucault said in an interview: “If power were never anything but repressive, if it
never did anything but to say no, do you really think one would be brought to obey it? What
makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn’t only weigh on
us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms
knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be considered as a productive network which runs
through the whole social body, much more than as a negative instance whose function is
repression” (Foucault, Power, 120). Similarly, in Discipline and Punish, he writes: “We must
cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative terms: it ‘excludes’, it
‘represses’, it ‘censors’, it ‘abstracts’, it ‘masks’, it ‘conceals’. In fact power produces: it
produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the
knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this production” (194).
17
As a manifestation of power, Foucault would point out that law produces and creates
far more often than it limits and constrains; however, the image of law as a force that primarily
constrains is a production of the discursive practices that have shaped the image of law in its
current form. These discourses blind subjects to the productive potential of the law and they help
to maintain current unequal distributions of law by reinforcing a false image of its functions.
16
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movements. It is always something that emerges from a complex set of interactions amongst and
between different assemblages. The idea that law is inherently limiting serves to reinforce
current distributions of power by preventing the subjects who engage with law from recognizing
its inherently productive nature.
In this chapter, it has been shown that Disgrace encourages its readers to think of law as a
productive force by calling into question aspects of the dogmatic image of law that rely upon
transcendental values and rights-based discourses. In the next chapter, it will be shown that the
novel carries its critique of rights forward by calling into question the idea of the subject as an
individual, one who is believed to be endowed with those rights and who is innately separate
from other, equally endowed individuals.
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Chapter Three
Animals in Disgrace: Individuals & Assemblages
One of the most thought-provoking aspects of Disgrace is the way in which the novel
depicts and problematizes human and nonhuman animal relationships. One of the reasons that
this aspect of the novel is so effective at forcing the reader to think is because the text
simultaneously allows the plight of non-human animals to dominate its pages while also refusing
to offer any clear or straightforward solutions to the pain and suffering that mark their lives. For
example, consider the scene in which David reflects on his concern for the sheep that Petrus will
slaughter for his party:
He has thought of buying the sheep from Petrus. But what will that accomplish?
Petrus will only use the money to buy new slaughter-animals, and pocket the
difference. And what will he do with the sheep anyway, once he has bought them out
of slavery? Set them free on the public road? Pen them up in the dog-cages and feed
them hay? A bond seems to have come into existence between himself and the two
Persians, he does not know how. The bond is not one of affection. It is not even a
bond with these two in particular, whom he could not pick out from a mob in a field.
Nevertheless, suddenly and without reason, their lot has become important to him.
(122)
In this scene, David reflects on the bond that is coming to exist between himself and these other
animals. When read slowly, it is clear that the passage offers the reader an opportunity to think
about a number of questions that do not have any clear answers. The passage indicates that there
is a moral problem surrounding the sheep, and yet it also makes clear that there isn’t any sort of
ethical or pragmatic solution available to David that would address the ethical dilemma. The
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sheep are going to die, and there isn’t any alternative possible in David’s world that could
contest that reality. At the same time, though, the novel does not seem to be presenting this
passage simply to reflect on the unaddressable nature of the problem. If that were the case, the
text could simply have stated the fact that David cannot change anything about the lot of the
sheep. Instead, though, Disgrace offers insight into the problem by posing a series of rhetorical
questions, thus making it more difficult for the reader to accept the foregone conclusion that
there is nothing that can be done for the sheep and inviting them to think beyond the limits of
David’s thinking as they consider each of the questions for themselves in turn: what will it
accomplish to buy the sheep? could he release them? could he put them in kennels and feed them
hay? And if the answer to each of these questions is no, then what are the reasons for these
inevitable blockages of thought?
One possible answer that is provided by the novel—and that is directly relevant to the
text’s engagement with images of law—is that David’s subjectivity has been constructed in such
a way that he is not able to think beyond the limitations imposed by the system of law that
governs his society. In order to fully appreciate the way that this suggestion emerges throughout
the text, though, it is helpful first to once again consider some of Deleuze’s thoughts on law,
since they are able to bring to the surface and connect many of the disparate and subtle images
that are at work within in the novel. Rather than presenting Deleuze’s ideas directly, though—as
has often been done throughout this thesis—it is necessary here to present Deleuze’s thoughts
through the words of posthumanist scholar Rosi Braidoitti. One of the reasons that such a
rendering of Deleuze’s ideas is especially fruitful at this point is because Braidotti has spent the
past three decades applying Deleuze’s philosophy to the changes that have taken place within the
twenty-first-century world, specifically concerning the evolving understanding of human and
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nonhuman animal relations.
In an essay titled “Locating Deleuze’s Eco-Philosophy,” Braidotti writes that “we are
witnessing today a proliferation of discourses that take life as a subject and not as the object of
social and discursive practices” (96). What this means—as she explains throughout the first
several pages of the essay—is that the dogmatic image of the subject is being replaced with a
new image of the subject, causing a reconsideration of “the Law, legal discourse and critical
jurisprudence” (96). In her other works, Braidotti lays out in painstaking detail the traits that
define the dogmatic image of the subject, and these traits are important to consider when
analyzing Disgrace because the novel draws heavily upon them in its depiction of David Lurie.
As Braidotti writes in The Posthuman, the image of the subject that is presented in humanist
thought is “equated with consciousness, universal rationality, and self-regulating ethical
behaviour,” as well as individuality, autonomy, and self-determination (loc. 310; 449).
Furthermore, she writes that, within the modern manifestation of law, such a subject is not only
assumed to exist but is, in fact, made to exist, due to the ways that the law forms subjects in
accordance with its image (Braidotti, Hanafin, & Colebrooke, 1).
In Disgrace, the connection between Lurie’s image of himself as an individual, rational,
self-determined agent and the law is well established . As has already been shown, David
repeatedly invokes the idea that he—as an autonomous individual—is equal to other individuals
with whom he interacts and that such individuals have recourse to a form of law that will “play it
by the book” in delivering justice (39). Of course, this belief in the law’s impartiality is
completely undermined by the fact that David often invokes the rules of the law when
encountering situations where the individuals involved possess completely unequal degrees of
power, thus drawing the reader’s attention to the illegitimacy of such notions. More importantly,
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though, because David’s notion of himself as an autonomous, rational individual is linked to his
way of thinking about law, the novel suggests that there is a connection between the two, and this
connection becomes especially important as David’s character changes throughout the novel,
primarily because those changes reflect Braidotti’s—and Deleuze’s—idea of the new subject that
is emerging in legal discourse today.
In “Locating Deleuze’s Eco-Philosophy,” Braidotti writes about the ways that the
posthuman turn has caused life itself to become considered as a subject. The reasons for this
transition in thought are numerous, but they primarily have to do with all of the discourses that
have dislodged “man” from the privileged center of philosophical thought. As humans have
increasingly come to understand themselves as part of a nature-culture continuum, the ideas that
underscored their distinction from other animals—and that have been used to define their
subjectivity against that of other forms of life—have become increasingly difficult to maintain.
As Braidotti writes:
The displacement of anthropocentrism is exposed by Deleuze and Guattari in the
theory of becoming minoritarian/becoming-animal. This process of molecularisation
entails the redefinition of one’s sense of attachment and connection to a shared world,
a territorial space. It expresses multiple ecologies of belonging, while it enacts the
transformation of human sensorial and perceptual co-ordinates, in order to
acknowledge the collective nature and outward-bound direction of what we call the
self. This ‘self ’ is in fact a moveable assemblage within a common life-space which
the subject never masters nor possesses, but merely inhabits, crosses, always in a
community, a pack, a group, or a cluster. (106)
By drawing on Deleuze’s insights about the rhizomatic nature of reality, Braidotti is able to
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articulate the ways that subjects are increasingly coming to view themselves as assemblages,
shaped by a wide variety of forces that converge upon their being, most of which they have little
power to control, and all of which are connected to a much larger assemblage that is also
undergoing a continual process of change. This image of the subject, however, is not an abstract,
idealized notion about the oneness of all life; rather, it is an image that emerges from the
awareness—acknowledged consciously or not—that there are not any lines separating humans
from the immanent force of life that is unfolding throughout the world (98). Due to the scientific
discourses with which we live, we are all currently being forced to recognize that our ideas about
our autonomy, the uniqueness of our intelligence, and our separation from other animals have
little merit, and we are thus increasingly led to consider the degree to which our lives are
inextricably entangled with those of countless others.
Of course, in Disgrace this same shift in understanding is dramatically portrayed through
the transformational process that David undergoes throughout the story. One of the most
significant impacts the novel has upon the reader is delivered via its depictions of David’s
interactions with the bodies of dogs who are euthanized at Bev’s clinic. Because these depictions
are delivered with such visceral language, it is almost impossible for a reader not to be affected
by them. It is possible, however, for a reader to encounter these sections—and to take note of the
changes taking place within David—without appreciating many of the nuanced ways that the
novel is engaging with posthumanist notions of the subject. In fact, the reason that the novel’s
treatment of non-human animals—as well as its conclusion—feels difficult to apprehend is
precisely because the text is engaging with these animals’ lives in a way that prevents easy
appeal to moral sentiments or simplistic solutions. In Disgrace, there is a complex
reconsideration taking place of the way that subjects understand both themselves and others, and
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in order to appreciate the depth of this reconsideration, it is necessary to slowly trace the novel’s
portrayal of non-human animals, especially dogs.
Although there are no dogs mentioned during the first six chapters of Disgrace, their
presence explodes onto the scene once David arrives in the Eastern Cape, and from this point on,
scarcely two or three pages will pass without dogs being mentioned in some way. By causing
dogs to permeate the background of the novel so thoroughly, Disgrace not only emphasizes the
degree to which its characters’ lives are inseparable from these animals’, but it also primes the
reader to pay attention when dogs—and their welfare—become central to the thematic
movement of the text as a whole. One of the first places in which this occurs is just after David
and Lucy visit Bill and Bev Shaw at their home, which rather repulses David. He notices the
“rubbishy furniture,” the “clutter of ornaments (porcelain shepherdesses, cowbells, an ostrichfeather flywhisk), the yammer of a radio, the cheeping of birds in cages,” and the “cats
everywhere underfoot” (70). He also glances into the back yard and sees only “an apple tree
dropping wormridden fruit, rampant weeds, an area fenced in with galvanized-iron sheets,
wooden pallets, old tyres, where chickens scratch around and what looks uncommonly like a
duiker snoozes in a corner” (71). Because the implications of David’s observations are all
negative, it comes as no surprise to the reader that he responds judgmentally when Lucy asks
him what he thinks of her friends.
“‘I’m sorry, my child,” he says. “I just find it hard to whip up an interest in the subject.
It’s admirable, what you do, what she does, but to me animal-welfare people are a bit like
Christians of a certain kind. Everyone is so cheerful and well-intentioned that after a while you
itch to go off and do some raping and pillaging. Or to kick a cat’” (71). In the previous chapter of
this thesis, this exchange was analyzed in order to show how it reflects Lucy’s commitment to
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immanence and David’s attachment to transcendent ideas, such as the idea that humans have
souls and animals do not. Now, though, it is important to consider the discussion in terms of the
way that it shows how unaffected David is—at this point in the story—by the suffering of other
animals and to also notice how deeply the same suffering affects Lucy.
When David implies that the work of helping the nation’s suffering animals is a “losing
battle” and that it probably makes both Lucy and Bev despondent to see the hopelessness of the
situation, Lucy replies that it doesn’t matter to her if the cause seems hopeless because the
animals that Bev helps are “greatly relieved” (71). She also shows that she cannot help but to
imagine herself experiencing their pain when she says “‘I don’t want to come back in another
existence as a dog or a pig and have to live as dogs or pigs live under us’” (72). When David
responds to this suggestion, he does so in a dismissive way, suggesting that because “we are of a
different order of creation from the animals,” any kindness we show to them ought to be done
out of “simple generosity, not because we feel guilty or fear retribution,” and it is through this
response that the novel sets up one of its longest and most drawn-out encounters: the clash
between living with an awareness of one’s place within the assemblage of life and the view that
one exists outside that assemblage, as an autonomous and self-regulating subject.
It is worth noting that the specific terms David uses to denounce Lucy’s way of thinking
about herself in relation to nonhuman animals are “guilt” and “fear [of] retribution.” These
words carry great significance for a number of reasons. First, they are significant because they
rely upon negative connotations to dismiss and rationalize Lucy’s efforts to think through her
connections to other animals. When Lucy suggested that she would not like to come back to live
under humans as a dog or pig, she does not literally seem to be suggesting that she believes in
reincarnation; after all, she had just stated that “there is only this life,” and a few pages later, she
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says that she isn’t sure that any living creatures possess souls (71). Thus, the purpose of her
words is not meant to invoke a literal belief in reincarnation but, rather, to present a way of
thinking that allows her to work through the process of imagining herself into the existence of
another animal, to think through its suffering, and to ask questions about how that suffering also
causes the suffering of others, including herself. By responding to this process in the way that he
does, David not only reveals how the belief he carries about his special place in the world
prevents him from entering into states of empathy and compassion for others, but he also draws
attention to two ideas that will play out in his story throughout the rest of the book: guilt and
retribution.
Although the concepts of guilt and retribution carry negative connotations—which David
draws upon at this point to refute Lucy’s empathy for other animals—they also have positive
manifestations that, when expressed in slightly different language, continue to carry the same
meaning. Guilt, of course, simply means that one is ethically convicted regarding their
interactions with others, and retribution implies an awareness that one’s actions are going to
result in negative consequences for oneself. And although David contends, at this point in the
text, that neither of these considerations are valid when determining how to interact with
nonhuman animals, they do eventually begin to shape his way of existing in the world.
After Lucy and David discuss the difference between relating to nonhuman animals in a
way that recognizes “the life we share with [them]” versus in a way that considers them to be “of
a different order of creation,” the text devotes several chapters to developing these ideas
further—mainly through dialogue—while also subtly and slowly showing that David is
beginning to change through his interactions with nonhuman animals. In fact, one of the first
points at which the reader notices that David is affected by these animals takes place in the very
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next chapter, when David is feeling lonely and goes to talk a walk in the yard. He lets himself
into the dog kennels and notices Katy, the “old bulldog bitch,” who is the only one who refuses
to stir when he enters (75). David goes and sits down next to Katy and says to her “Abandoned,
are we?” And then Lucy finds him, sleeping next to the old dog.
Although this scene progresses almost too quickly for the reader to notice the
contradiction between David’s beliefs and his actions, it is significant to note that David—who
does not profess to even like dogs—seeks out the comfort of this dog when he is feeling
troubled. More significantly, though, it is worth noting the words he uses to speak to her:
“Abandoned, are we?” By using the inclusive we to speak to Katy, David is including himself in
her abandonment, and because the text has made it very clear that David is struggling with
feelings of isolation and loneliness in his old age, there is a suggestion here that he is beginning
to recognize a shared vulnerability with Katy. This sense of a shared vulnerability is very
important, both because it opens up space for David to begin to think of himself and others
differently than he had in the past, and because it relates to Braidotti’s notion of a shared
vulnerability that helps us to think of our subjectivity differently. As she writes:
The proper subject of the posthuman convergence is not ‘Man’, but a new collective
subject, a ‘we-are-(all)-in-this-together-but-we-are-not-one-and-the-same’ kind of
subject. This means that humanity is both a vulnerable and an insurgent category.
Posthuman subjectivity can be understood as a process of becoming in its own
immanence and not in binary oppositional terms. (Posthuman Knowledge, 54)
Despite the fact that David is still very far—at this point in the text—from thinking of himself in
a “we-are-(all)-in-this-together-but-we-are-not-one-and-the-same” way, Braidotti’s words do
reflect the trajectory that his transformation will take. Slowly, throughout the text, he will come
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to see himself more as a part of the assemblage of life of the Eastern Cape, and the scene with
Katy offers the first insight into the process through which this transformation will take place:
through a recognition of a shared vulnerability that leads him into empathic modes of relating to
others and, ultimately, to the realization that his life is affected by the lives of other animals.
Before discussing David’s transformation further, though, it is important to note that this
same scene with Katy also invokes one of the other thematic movements of the novel’s
engagement with nonhuman animals: their place within human legal systems. Just after David
wakes up from his nap with Katy, Lucy reflects on Katy’s suffering. She says:
‘Poor old Katy, she’s in mourning. No one wants her, and she knows it. The irony is,
she must have offspring all over the district who would be happy to share their homes
with her. But it’s not in their power to invite her. They are part of the furniture, part of
the alarm system. They do us the honour of treating us like gods, and we respond by
treating them like things.’ (76)
Lucy’s specific choice of words in this passage—“part of the furniture, part of the alarm
system”—is significant because it creates a link between dogs and the two main areas of the law
that are equated with dogs in Disgrace: the systems created by the legal institutions of capitalism
and the legally sanctioned violence of apartheid. By stating that the dogs are “part of the alarm
system,” Lucy is acknowledging the fact that dogs have been used for decades in South Africa to
police and control black South Africans, and the novel continues to remind the reader of this fact
throughout the rest of its pages. The text says that Lucy’s dogs are “watchdogs, all of
them…working dogs, on short contracts” and that South Africa is a country where “dogs are bred
to snarl at the mere smell of a black man” (58, 108). By scattering statements such as these
throughout the text, the novel makes it clear that dogs have been—and are being—used to
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perpetuate the inequalities of power that were—and are—bolstered by South African law.
Furthermore, through the use of such scenes, Disgrace establishes a strong connection between
dogs and power, and this connection is strengthened through some of the text’s most powerful
scenes. When the three men who rape Lucy, for instance, murder the dogs in their cells, it is
made clear to the reader that they are doing so because the dogs represent the legal institution of
apartheid (93).18 And when Lucy compares herself to a dog, she does so alongside a discussion
of legal terms: cards, weapons, property, and rights (199).
In much the same way, the novel also links dogs to the system of capitalism that is
sustained through the protection of South Africa’s legal system. When she says that dogs are
“part of the furniture” and that they are treated “like things,” Lucy is acknowledging the way that
nonhuman animals’ bodies are placed on the outside of the binary, subject-object logic of
humanism. Within the framework of humanist legal and economic systems, either an entity is a
rational, autonomous, self-governed subject—and, thus, capable of bearing rights—or that entity
is not, and it is thus denied access to rights and is capable of being commodified as an object.
One point at which the novel draws the reader’s attention to the effects of this logic in an
especially clear and powerful way occurs when David begins bringing the bodies of the dogs
who have been euthanized at Bev’s clinic to the local hospital where their bodies can be
incinerated. In this scene, three separate images are woven together in a way that draws the
reader’s attention to all three: the physical waste and excess generated by systems of capitalism,
18

As further evidence supporting the idea that the dogs in disgrace are employed
symbolically in order to draw attention to unequal distributions of power, consider the following
passage, in which David imagines the scene that must have unfolded for Lucy: “The men, for
their part, drank up her fear, revelled in it, did all they could to hurt her, to menace her, to
heighten her terror. Call your dogs! they said to her. Go on, call your dogs! No dogs? Then let us
show you dogs!” (141) In these lines, the word “dogs” is clearly being used to figuratively refer
to power. Lucy has been deprived of her dogs—of her power—and the men take that power for
themselves.
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the bodies of the dogs, and the bodies of poor South Africans who make their homes near the
dump. In the very beginning of the passage, the first two are suggested, when David reflects that
he would not want to simply leave the dogs bodies to be incinerated because that would mean
“leaving them on the dump with the rest of the weekend’s scourings: with waste from the
hospital wards, carrion scooped up at the roadside, malodorous refuse from the tannery—a
mixture both casual and terrible” (141). Already, this reflection marks considerable distance from
the attitude David reflected earlier in the novel when Bev asked him if he likes animals and when
he responded by joking that he eats them so he must like them (78). No longer is David able to
see the animals who have died as objects to be consumed; no longer does it feel okay to him to
equate their dead bodies with the physical objects that are discarded at the dump. Now, to do so
would feel both casual and terrible.
But the passage does not end there. It goes on, describing in visceral detail the way that
the dogs’ bodies are incinerated. It tells the reader, using the following language, that on David’s
first visit to the dump, he had left it to the workmen to dispose of the bodies:
Rigor mortis had stiffened the corpses overnight. The dead legs caught in the bars of
the trolley, and when the trolley came back from its trip to the furnace, the dog would
as often as not come riding back too, blackened and grinning, smelling of singed fur,
its plastic covering burnt away. After a while the workmen began to beat the bags
with the backs of their shovels before loading them, to break the rigid limbs. It was
then that he intervened and took over the job himself. (141)
This dark description of the treatment of the dogs’ bodies is then followed up closely with a
reflection on the humans who are gathered at the incinerator. The reader is told that they are
mostly women and children, all poor, who wait in the morning to sift through the hospital waste,
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looking for “syringes, pins, washable bandages, anything for which there is a market” (142). By
using the specific word market, the text subtly links the waste and suffering of the dump to the
capitalist forces that drive people to engage in such miserable work so that they can afford to
live. It then reinforces this connection by stating that “if what he brings to the dump does not
interest them, that is only because the parts of a dead dog can neither be sold or eaten,” and this
line, once again, creates a link between the dogs and the market forces that regard them as things.
Ultimately, the image that is presented throughout the scene at the dump suggests a form
of evil that is—as the text stated at the beginning of the scene—“both casual and terrible” (141).
It is a form of evil that seems to reflect Coetzee’s own thinking when he described—in his
Jerusalem Prize Acceptance speech—a “banal kind of evil,” and it is one with which the text
explicitly engages over and over, including at the very end of this horrible scene (Coetzee and
Attwell, 96). After having drawn the reader’s attention to the suffering that is taking place at the
dump—and after having linked that suffering, by association, to the suffering that marked the
lives of the dead dogs—the novel presents a series of reflections that are delivered in David’s
voice. He asks himself: “Why has he taken on this job? To lighten the burden on Bev Shaw? For
that it would be enough to drop off the bags at the dump and drive away. For the sake of the
dogs? But the dogs are dead; and what do dogs know of honour and dishonour anyway?” (142).
The text then answers this question by stating that it is: “For himself, then. For his idea of the
world, a world in which men do not use shovels to beat corpses into a more convenient shape for
processing” (142).
This language reflects a shift in David’s thinking that is, at first, difficult to grasp. After
all, David is right. The dogs are dead; they do not care how their bodies are treated. But David’s
thinking in this section indicates that he is beginning to think in some of the ways that are
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described by Rosi Braidotti in “Locating Deleuze’s Eco-philosophy.” He is beginning to
recognize that the suffering that is permitted by the systems we create affects us as individuals,
regardless of whether we engage in that suffering or not. Moreover, he is beginning to recognize
that his response to that suffering shapes him, both when he is ignoring it and when he is
responding to it in ways that grant honor to the lives of the dead dogs. For Rosi Braidotti, this
sort of awareness reflects a recognition of life as a rhizomatic subject. It reflects a “philosophy of
radical immanence and affirmative becoming, which activates a nomadic subject into sustainable
processes of transformation” (105). In Disgrace, David is presented as a character who is in the
process of such a transformation, shifting from a man who thinks of himself as an individual,
autonomous agent who is incapable of change to a person who sees himself as being
interconnected with and affected by other living creatures. And because the novel draws the
reader’s attention to the process that is causing David to experience this transformation, it is able
to offer insight into the ways that such a change most often takes place.
Although there is no point within the text at which David could be said to have
conclusively changed, there are a number of points that strike the reader as significant and that
suggest that his former worldview is no longer mapping adequately onto the reality of his lived
experience. One of those places is the scene in which David considers the plight of the sheep. At
this point in the text, as has already been noted, David’s demeanor towards other animals is very
different than it had been earlier in the text, and although the novel does not make it clear that
this change is due to David’s awareness of his own vulnerability, the language of the passage
does seem to imply that this is the case. After all, David’s reflection about the sheep takes place
shortly after he and Lucy have both been attacked, and his description of the bond that is forming
between himself and the animals falls just after he thinks about the mortality of the sheep, stating
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that “It seems a miserable way to spend the last two days of one’s life” (122). This placement of
the reflection on the sheep suggests that something about his encounter with pain, suffering, and
nearness to death caused David to notice the suffering of other living creatures more acutely,
reflecting Braidotti’s insight that an awareness of shared vulnerability creates opportunities for
new ways of conceptualizing our relation to others.
It is also worth noting that this passage marks the first point that occurs in the text in
which David seems to desire change to take place within himself, and this shift is unlikely to go
unnoticed by the reader, considering the fact that David has remarked so often—both to others
and to the reader—that he does not believe himself to be capable of change. Thus, when he asks
himself: “Do I have to change?”, the reader is drawn into the question more fully than they
would be if the novel had not granted so much attention to the unchangeable nature of David’s
character up to this point. Because it has done so, though, when the reader experiences this point
in the text, they are likely to wonder about why David is suddenly desiring the change that he has
so adamantly resisted. The answer, of course—as indicated by the preceding paragraph—is that
he feels himself incapable of experiencing a connection that he suddenly wants to experience. As
he is staring at the sheep in the yard, David is drawn toward the animals, but they retreat from his
approach. He then thinks of Bev Shaw and the way that she could relate so naturally to other
animals and he wonders: “How does she get it right, this communion with animals?”, and it is
this question that prompts him to wonder if he needs to change (123).
Because this scene indicates to the reader that David is desiring types of connection that
are only possible if he undergoes some sort of transformation, it seems natural when—twenty
pages later—they encounter David on the side of the road, having pulled over, with tears
streaming down his face, wondering what is happening to him. This is not to say, of course, that
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the scene does not deeply affect the reader, but rather, it is simply to say that the novel creates a
through-line that stretches from David’s first scene at the clinic through his attack and then
through the scene where he regards the sheep before it depicts him in a state of profound
transformation. It is important to notice this through line in order to appreciate the degree to
which David’s exposure to his own vulnerability and his exposure to the lives of other animals
frees dislodges him from his beliefs about his separation from other animals and his inability to
experience change. By the time the reader experiences David pull to the side of the road and they
read about the tears that are flowing down his face and about how he cannot stop the shaking of
his hands, they are fully aware that it is David’s mere exposure to the lives of the animals on the
Eastern Cape that is causing such a profound change in his character, and the lines that fall
immediately after this scene reinforce this notion.
As David reflects to the reader about his experiences at Bev’s clinic, he describes a scene
that is almost the complete opposite of the description of his first day helping her euthanize the
dogs. Whereas upon his first visit he had thought “They can smell what you are thinking: what
nonsense!”, he now thinks “If, more often than not, the dog fails to be charmed, it is because of
his presence: he gives off the wrong smell (They can smell your thoughts), the smell of shame”
(79; 139). And whereas previously he had felt awkward interacting with the dogs—“Awkwardly
he joins in the tussle, pressing the dog’s hind legs together, forcing it to sit on its haunches”—he
now gently offers them his fingers to lick as they prepare to die, thinking “Why should a creature
with the shadow of death upon it feel him flinch away as if its touch were abhorrent?” (78; 140).
By juxtaposing these two scenes in the way that it does, Disgrace draws the reader’s attention to
both the changes that are taking place within David and to the reasons that those changes are
finally able to occur. In fact, it strongly urges the reader to think about the reasons those changes
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are occurring by forcing David to ask himself the question, saying:
He does not understand what is happening to him. Until now he has been more or less
indifferent to animals. Although in an abstract way he disapproves of cruelty, he
cannot tell whether by nature he is cruel or kind. He is simply nothing. He assumes
that people from whom cruelty is demanded in the line of duty, people who work in
slaughterhouses, for instance, grow carapaces over their souls. Habit hardens: it must
be so in most cases, but it does not seem to be so in his. He does not seem to have the
gift of hardness. (140)
Of course, the reader recognizes the irony here. There is no such thing as a gift of hardness, just
as David’s other assumption—that “people from cruelty is demand…grow carapaces over their
souls”—is also not true. There is nothing natural about the sort of hardened, isolated, and closedoff life that David had led up until this point. In fact, it is far more natural for humans to be
affected by other living creatures. However, as the text makes very clear in its first several
chapters, David was prevented from acknowledging his connection to others because of his
adherence to a belief system that holds humans to be individual, isolated, autonomous, and
rational agents, responsible only for their own actions and primarily affected by their own
decisions.
The reason that this insight is significant—in terms of the overall explorations of this
thesis—is because the legal discourses that uphold our current image of law flow forth from the
same discourses that shaped David’s subjectivity at the beginning of the novel. They are the
discourses that insist upon the individuality of the subject and that prevent subjects from being
affected by others because they deny that such affects and connections are possible. But
Disgrace reveals the fragility of these ways of thinking by showing that even a character such as
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David—a man who has “always been more or less indifferent to animals”—cannot sustain his
belief in humanity’s separation from the rest of life once he is even slightly exposed to the lives
of other creatures (139). It is this fragility that Deleuze exposes in many of his works, when he
writes about the ways that dogmatic images of thought prevent real thinking from occurring.
Dogmatic images—which take the form of “everyone knows” lines of thinking—function by
blinding subjects to all the evidence that would contradict their legitimacy. In this case, it is
through adherence to the dogmatic image of the subject that David has been able to prevent
himself from seeing the ways that he shares the same form of life that is shared by the other
animals around him. Once he is exposed to those other animals, though—and to their suffering—
he is unable to sustain this belief any longer, and he is forced to rethink his separation from the
rest of life.
This sort of transformation, Braidotti contends, “lays the foundations for a system of
ethical values where ‘life’ stands central,” not as a “pre-established given, but rather posited as
process, interactive and open-ended” (105). Braidotti’s attempt to prevent her readers from
thinking of life as a pre-established given reflects Deleuze’s insistence on mapping the actual
convergences, transformations, processes, and potentials of a given entity when thinking about
that entity—such as life itself—but it also reflects Disgrace’s engagement with notions of life,
which challenge the reader to think of life as a messy, chaotic, unfolding that involves both
human and nonhuman animals in its process of becoming, and one that is profoundly shaped by
the laws and institutions that humans create.
One of the ways in which Disgrace prompts readers to think about the effects that these
systems have upon the unfolding of life in a given time and place is by utilizing language that
invokes other works of literature that also dealt with human-created legal systems. As Calina
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Ciobanu points out, Disgrace “operates on an intertextual register” by invoking a vast number of
different works, drawing lines from each in a way that causes a reconsideration of the theme that
is explored in the original work (670). An obvious example of this can be found in the section
that ends the scene at the dump, when the reader is told, “the dogs are brought to the clinic
because they are unwanted: because we are too menny” (142-3). The line we are too menny is a
clear reference to Thomas Hardy’s Jude the Obscure. In the original work, though, it described
the bodies of children who killed themselves because they believed that their existence was
causing too much difficulty for their parents, who were struggling to support the small family. By
invoking this line, Coetzee is doing something that is both interesting and unsettling, and
Ciobanu captures the effect in very clear language:
This instance of intertextuality signifies something like this: We recognize being ‘too
menny’ as a tragedy in Hardy’s novel; what happens when we extend the logic of
Hardy’s doomed children to these doomed dogs? What assumptions, what disavowals
become manifest when we consider life alongside life? Within a humanist framework,
this would be a wholly inappropriate question. The act of setting the deaths of dogs
alongside the deaths of children would run the risk of suggesting some sort of
equivalence between them. At best, we would be anthropomorphizing animals; at
worst, valuating animal life at the expense of human life, elevating the animal by
undermining the human. (669)
Of course, though, this is not at all the effect that is created upon the reader. Rather, the text
invokes this line in a way that calls into question the “humanist modes of thought that we assume
as given” (669). The novel is equating the wrongness of the two situations in a way that allows
for nonhuman animals’ suffering to be considered alongside the suffering that is created by legal
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systems such as those that caused the deaths in Hardy’s novel. In Jude the Obscure, it is made
very clear to the reader that the economic and social systems that dominated life in England led
to the deaths of the small children.19 In the same way, Disgrace strongly suggests that there is a
link between the suffering of the people and the dogs of Eastern Cape and the economic and
social systems that have been created through South African law.
Just as the text uses the visceral imagery of the scene at the dump to direct the reader’s
attention toward the “casual and terrible” evil generated by the economic exploitation of
capitalism and its binary logic that regards nonhuman animals as things, it also uses another
visceral scene to tie suffering to the larger systems that have been created by human laws.
Shortly after Lucy is raped, David attempts to make sense of the tragedy that occurred, and he
thinks to himself—in another of his many reflections that seem more directed at the reader than
delivered as internal monologue—“A risk to own anything: a car, a pair of shoes, a packet of
cigarettes. Not enough to go around, not enough cars, shoes, cigarettes. Too many people, too
few things” (95-96). Because this line mirrors the we are too menny language that will be
invoked in the later scene at the dump, the two are linked within the novel. More importantly,
though, because the language of this scene refers to the lack of resources within South Africa, it
is calling into question the way that those resources are allocated. Of course, the reader realizes,

Just before Little Father Time kills himself and his siblings, the text reads: “The failure
to find another lodging, and the lack of room in this house for his father, had made a deep
impression on the boy — a brooding undemonstrative horror seemed to have seized him” (222).
It is also worth noting, here, that Coetzee’s invocation of Jude the Obscure deepens Disgrace’s
commitment to exploring the ways that humans need to become more aware of nonhuman
animal suffering because this is also one of the major themes in Hardy’s novel, as evidenced by
the passage in which the family’s pig must be slaughtered:
“The blood flowed out in a torrent instead of in the trickling stream she had desired. The dying
animal’s cry assumed its third and final tone, the shriek of agony; his glazing eyes riveting
themselves on Arabella with the eloquently keen reproach of a creature recognizing at last the
treachery of those who had seemed his only friends” (42).
19
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however, that the problem is not actually that there are “too many people, too few things” but
that the way in which those things are allocated leads to brutal suffering. This sense is then
reinforced when David’s thoughts continue and he thinks: “Not human evil, just a vast
circulatory system, to whose workings pity and terror are irrelevant” (96). This line—not human
evil, just a vast circulatory system—is very significant in the context of this dark novel. By
linking the suffering that is depicted in Disgrace to a vast system, the novel is drawing attention
to the ways that individual acts of evil are unnecessary in order for great suffering to be
perpetuated. Rather, all that is necessary is adherence to systems that create inevitable suffering
for both human and nonhuman animals alike.
Thus, it is extremely fitting that one of the solutions this novel seems to offer to the
suffering it has presented comes in the form of Lucy’s renunciation of this system. As she is
expressing to David her desires for the life she wants to live, Lucy says that she wants to “start at
ground level. With nothing. Not with nothing but. With nothing. No cards, no weapons, no
property, no rights, no dignity’” (200). David responds to this suggestion by saying: “Like a
dog.” And Lucy repeats, in a way that implicitly seems to shift the emphasis: “Like a dog” (200).
As Calina Ciobanu once again points out, this phrase is undoubtedly meant to invoke The
Trial by Franz Kafka, in which the main character—Josef K—ends the story by saying “like a
dog” as he allows himself to be killed, and there is absolutely no doubt that Coetzee would have
been aware of this fact (Ciobanu 686). Coetzee’s debt to Kafka has been explored by a number
of critics, and in interviews he has given, he himself acknowledges this debt (Medin 82; Danta
726; Meyers 334; Attwell, Doubling the Point 199). Furthermore, many of Coetzee’s earlier
novels contain clear references to Kafka. The main character of The Life and Times of Michael K
seems to draw his name from The Trial’s Josef K, and there is a scene in Waiting for the
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Barbarians that completely rewrites the entire story of Kafka’s “In the Penal Colony” (Moses
121). But what is the effect of this intertextual invocation of Kafka? One possibility is that it
performs within the novel a similar work to that which was performed by the we-are-too-menny
invocation of Jude the Obscure; it draws a connection between the themes explored in The Trial
and those that are playing out in Disgrace. Since The Trial engages in a long and drawn-out
exploration of the ways that modern legal systems trap and dehumanize the subjects whom they
regulate, the effect of including a direct and well-known reference to this story by Kafka causes
the thematic similarities at work with Disgrace to be underscored.
Just as significantly, though, the reference also serves to re-write the phrase “like a dog.”
Whereas in The Trial, the term was used to indicate that K’s humanity has finally been
completely stripped away from him, its use in Disgrace shifts the emphasis away from the
differences between humans and dogs and places it instead on their similarities. In stating that
she wants to be “like a dog,” Lucy is reclaiming the phrase. She is removing the disgrace
associated with being like an animal, and claiming for herself all the ways that the similarities
allow for new opportunities for becoming. As Calina Ciobanu once again explains very well:
Clearly, the phrase ‘Like a dog,’ which is doubled in this scene (uttered first by Lurie
and then by Lucy), resonates first and foremost with the shame that marks K at the
end of his life. And yet, K's death need not dictate the terms of Lucy's life. My point
is that while we might read Lucy's statement as ‘I am like a dog, because I am
reduced to the level of the animal that has nothing, the novel holds open the
possibility, via acts of revisionary citation and the radical potentiality of the literary,
that to be ‘like a dog’ in this new world is not necessarily to be subhuman, after all.
(686)
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Through her words and actions at the end of the story, Lucy is offering a different vision of the
subject, one that is not defined as an individual, autonomous, rational agent, but rather as a much
larger assemblage, shaped by the interactions that take place within it. By associating Lucy with
the dogs at the same time as she articulates her vision for a future in which she will forge a
family unit with Petrus on the Eastern Cape, the novel reinforces the suggestion that Lucy’s
desire to be “like a dog” allows her to embrace connection and to distance herself from the
discourses about rights, property, and power that prevent her from experiencing the connections
she desires.
And, of course, the association of Lucy with the dogs that play such a crucial role in
Disgrace also holds huge implications for any interpretation of the novel’s conclusion. Because
Lucy has been tied to the image of a dog throughout the text, though, the novel also seems to be
implying at this point that David is not only giving up the dog but that he is also giving up Lucy,
freeing her to live into the new becomings that she is allowing herself to enter. Moreover, by
giving up the dog David is following in Lucy’s path and becoming “like a dog” in his own way.
He may not be entirely giving up his rights, his cards, or his property but, by this point in the
novel, he has significantly distanced himself from the image he carried of the world, one which
was predicated on rational rules, transcendental values, and individual subjects who interact
freely with one another. In its place, he has begun to think of the world more in the way that
Lucy does, recognizing the ways that creative acts can lead to new becomings, gaining ever more
awareness that his person is shaped by a complex web of interactions with others, and replacing
his tendency to think in terms of abstractions with a desire to think about life in terms of
immanent conditions.
The only reason that such an ending is effective, however, is because David’s process of
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transformation was gradual and because it was marked by the sorts of shifts that Braidotti writes
about in “Locating Deleuze’s Ecophilosopy.” Specifically, it came about through David’s
awareness of his shared vulnerability with the animals with whom he interacted. By coming
face-to-face with their suffering for long enough to free him of his previously held vision of the
subject, David slowly came to recognize the limitations of beliefs about his own independence.
Through this process, he developed the kind of self that Braidotti suggests is possible in this
current age:
The kind of ‘self’ that is ‘styled’ in and through [a process of recognizing shared life
and shared vulnerability] is not one, nor is it an anonymous multiplicity. It is an
embedded and embodied set of interrelations, constituted in and by the immanence of
expressions, acts and interactions with others and held together by the powers of
remembrance.
For David, those powers of remembrance are defined by the same memories and images that
most profoundly affected the reader as they read the text: the images of the dead dogs’ bodies,
the scenes of waste and struggle at the dump, the depiction of the sheep awaiting slaughter, and
the descriptions of the dogs awaiting death at Bev’s clinic. By allowing the reader to follow
David on this visceral and moving engagement with the other vulnerable animals who live on the
Eastern Cape, the novel not only thematically suggests that the dogmatic image of the subject
must be replaced with something new, but it also affects this same change within the reader and
offers in its place a way of thinking about life that is far more open to new possibilities of
becoming.
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Conclusion
Disgrace’s Engagement with Death: A New Image of Life
In this thesis, many of Deleuze’s ideas have been explored by considering their
explication within the pages of Disgrace. The limitations imposed by dogmatic images of
thought have been fleshed out through consideration of the ways that Disgrace disrupts these
images via violent and visceral encounters, ones that open up space for thinking to take place
that falls outside the dogmatic image. The Deleuzian notion of law as a jurisprudential process of
unfolding has been juxtaposed against the image of law as a set of rules, and the legal language
of Disgrace has been shown to encourage the reader to think beyond the latter, in order to see the
law as ever-changing and open to new possibilities. The limitations of transcendental notions
have been interrogated through consideration of the ways that these notions prevent David from
experiencing connection or desire, and the benefits of thinking in terms of immanence have been
revealed through consideration of Lucy’s life and ethics. And finally, the Deleuzian notion of the
assemblage as a cite where various intensities overlap—lending momentary stability to a given
place, subject, or concept—has been shown to be a more accurate way of understanding the
world than is possible when thinking of places, subjects, and concepts as if they were fixed or
stable entities. In each of these discussions, the law has been interrogated as a unique
manifestation of power, one that simultaneously emerges from social discourse and that
functions as a particularly potent form of discourse itself. The law has been re-conceptualized as
a regulating force, one that influences the interactions that take place between different
assemblages within a given society and one that lends legitimacy to the norms that govern
subjects’ lives.
There is, however, a major idea that is present in Disgrace that has not yet been
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adequately addressed in this thesis, and it is an idea that comes to bear not only on these other
ideas but also upon any image of law that is dominant with a given society: the idea of death.
Throughout the thesis, the idea of death has often been implicitly connected to other ideas that
are being explored within Disgrace. Whether discussing David’s fears of old age, the Byron
Opera, or the bodies of the dogs, the idea of death has subtly lingered all around the edges of the
exploration being undertaken. In Disgrace, though, death does not stay at the edges of the page;
it is viscerally presented to the reader, often forcing them to acknowledge its presence and to
consider the ways that ideas about death circulate within a society. Thus, it would be wrong to
end this discussion of the text without also considering the ways that Disgrace’s treatment of
death relates to its treatment of law, and once again, in order to undertake this consideration, it
will be helpful to turn to Deleuze.
In Deleuzian thought, death is not considered to be in binary opposition to life. Rather, it
is considered to be another stage of becoming that is immanent to life’s unfolding. Life, in this
sense, is not conceptualized as something that belongs to an individual subject; instead, it is
conceptualized as a process that manifests itself through countless living beings. It does not end
at the threshold of death; mortality is not its central stage; and it cannot be properly understood
within the sorts of humanist frameworks put forth by thinkers such as Heidegger (Baidotti,
“Locating Deleuze’s Eco-Philosophy, 112). In contrast to these humanist notions of life,
Braidotti—drawing on Deleuze—advances the idea of life as zoe, life as a force that carries itself
forward through death, and as she writes in “Locating Deleuze’s Eco-Philosophy,” this rethinking of death as part of the continuum of life clashes with many of the notions that are
dominant in the dogmatic image of law. As she explains:
The key implication for the Law of Deleuze’s re-casting of the life–death distinction
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in terms of a vital continuum based on internal differentiations is the double
overturning of individualism on the one hand—in favour of complex singularities—
and of anthropocentrism on the other—in favour of multiplicities of flows and
assemblages. (113)
By re-casting death as an essential aspect of life, Deleuze and Braidotti challenge many of the
ideas that are central to the contemporary image of law, especially the notion that law ought to
strive to safeguard individual human life to the greatest extent possible.
In the dogmatic image of law, the individual is assumed to have the right to live for as
long as they are able, and the law derives much of its legitimacy from its purported role as
protector of this right. Today, the law is still widely regarded as a force that safeguards
individual human rights against anything that would impose itself upon them, one that frees each
subject as fully as possible to pursue their desires, and one that strives to extend the lives of
human subjects for as long as possible, no matter the costs. However, the emphasis that the
dogmatic image places on protecting individual human lives prevents consideration of the quality
of life that is being made possible, through law, for the vast majority of living creatures. While it
is becoming increasingly apparent that this image of law is diminishing the quality of life of
almost all living creatures across the globe, it’s alternative has been slow in arriving, largely due
to the difficulty of thinking beyond the humanist notions that have shaped the law into its current
manifestation. Adherence to the belief in fixed rules, minimalistic rights, and the individual
human as the subject of law have remained strong, despite other changes in understanding that
have accompanied the posthuman turn.
In Disgrace, though, each of these characteristics of the dogmatic image of law is called
into question, and the effects of living in accordance with that image’s logic are displayed
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through horrific and violent scenes. Moreover, by including notions of death alongside other
notions that it interrogates—notions about rules, rights, and individualism—Disgrace suggests
that it is necessary to think differently about death in order to transform the quality of life, and
one of the primary ways it makes this suggestion is by drawing attention to the ways in which
death and life are each regulated by the law. When David is considering the plight of the sheep
that are going to be slaughtered for Petrus’s party, for instance, he remarks that he has never
cared which animals will live or which will die (123). However, he also notes that, in this
instance, he does—for some reason—seem to care. Specifically, he says: “In this case, I am
disturbed I can’t say why [sic]” (123). The reason for this sudden concern is not revealed to the
reader explicitly, but the suggestion is that David suddenly cares because he has entered
imaginatively into the lives of these two sheep. He has asked himself what it might be like to end
his life in the way that they must end theirs, and this act of imagining himself into their bodies
has changed the way he thinks about the sheep. By thinking about their experiences, he is drawn
out from the isolation and disconnection that mark the majority of his experiences, and he begins
to see the world differently as a result.
This description of David’s imaginative movement into the experiences of other living
creatures is paralleled in other sections of the text. When David is struggling to understand
Lucy’s experience of being sexually violated, for instance, he asks himself—and, by extension,
the reader—if he has it “in him to be the woman,” and when he is euthanizing the dogs at Bev’s
clinic, he increasingly finds himself thinking about the world as it is perceived by the dogs (157,
213). By presenting these scenes with vivid language and careful detail, the text invites its
readers to also imaginatively enter into the lives of other living creatures and to think about the
ways that current systems of law affect their bodily existence (Marais 76). This task, of course, is
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never fully possible, but the novel nonetheless attempts to draw readers into the process,
indicating through David that even the slightest act of imagining another living creature’s bodily
experiences can result in a rethinking of the structures that shape the world in which one lives.
One of the motifs that is repeated over and over again throughout Disgrace is the notion
of the perfective voice, which signifies “an action carried through to its conclusion” (69). Often,
the text interrupts its own narrative with the interjection of a string of verbs that exemplify the
perfective: “I live, I have lived, I lived” (69); or “Burned —burnt—burnt up” (162). These
interjections, though—like many other aspects of David’s narration—serve mostly to draw the
reader’s attention to the limitations and blockages that are imposed on David by his way of
seeing the world. Ultimately, the idea of the perfective is itself exposed by the novel to be
misleading. In Disgrace, there is no such thing as a final conclusion. Just as the title of the novel
is written in the present tense, indicating a continuing condition, so too, will life itself continue to
unfold long after the death of any one individual (Gorra 7). The shape of that life, though, will
depend very greatly on the image of law that shapes the interactions taking place within and
between all the assemblages that comprise this world.
When reading Disgrace, the reader is invited to reconsider many of the ideas that
underlie the current image of law dominant in Western society. In order to do so, though, they
must also expose themselves to horrific scenes of violence and poverty, ones that have been
brought into existence through the legal contorsions of power that define the society in which
David and Lucy live. The hope that lies on the other side of all this darkness, though, is that by
engaging with the tasks set forth in this text—tasks of recognizing the limitations of one’s own
subject position, tasks of thinking through seemingly addressable problems, and tasks of
imaginatively entering into the lives of other creatures—the reader will be able to think beyond
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the limitations that are imposed by the dogmatic image of law and begin to imagine, as David
does, their own possibilities for a better world.
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